A case of an over-hyped fighter plane and a “mythical” fight:
the Ta152H and the 14-4-1945 Ludwigslust
aerial combat.
Last update: January 12h, 2018
The aerial combat that took place near Ludwigslust on April 14, 1945, between Hawker Tempests of
486 Sq and Ta152Hs of JG301,
is quite famous, having been reported many times, usually when talking about
Ta152H and in order to “demonstrate” the superiority of the German fighter on
any other Allied fighter (even the most advanced ones, like the Tempest, P47
and P51, and even at low altitudes, where Ta152H was NOT designed for).
Actually, almost invariably just one version is
shown: the report of the German ace Willi Reschke,
who managed to shot down a Tempest flown by Owen Mitchell.
Some times ago I’ve read
a couple of discussions on the episode, on public Forums (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/9611037326/p/1
and http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bf-109-vs-spitfire-vs-fw-190-vs-p-51-a-13369-6.html
), where for (I believe) the first time that German reports were laudably
compared with the Allies version.
Months later, I managed to find some other reports
(or stories) on that episode and re-examined the whole issue.
One thing is certain: in this case, just like in many
other cases of controversial historical episodes, reports differs in many
details, even important ones.
We can’t fully believe at one source and fully believe
to other sources at the same time: someone is wrong, and probably more than one
is wrong at least on some details. The hard work is to identify strong and
trustable points and separate them by mistakes, inaccuracies, bad memories,
propaganda and maybe lies.
The interesting thing is that the two German reports
differs between themselves and that these difference, also compared with the
Allies’ accounts, could reveal some usually overlooked facts.
I think that it’s possible to get the picture of what
likely happened, with a reasonably good degree of approximation.
Of course, stating the inconsistencies between reports
and their fragmentary nature, I can’t say this is the final word on that
episode (very likely we’ll never be able to get the absolute truth on any
detail, just to come closer to it).
And, for sure, this has to be considered as a “work
in progress”, that could be denied or confirmed by new findings.
But it seems to me to be much more likely that the
version usually shown.
I’ll report here all the accounts I’ve got, followed
by an analysis and by my description of what probably happened.
I’ve also added some considerations (and facts too …)
to demonstrate how much hype surrounds Ta152H, likely an excellent interceptor
at high altitudes but often unjustifiably and unconditionally defined as “the
best” fighter of WWII.
It was a good plane but it wasn’t the best, at least at
low and medium heights, as combat scores themselves prove.
CloCloZ
January 7th, 2009
Abstract:
The first part ("PART ONE: THE LUDWIGSLUST AERIAL COMBAT")
shows that also usually overlooked details and inconsistencies in German
reports indicate a picture quite consistent with the hypothesis that the combat
ended with a score of 1-1 between Ta152s and Tempests, explaining what happened
to the German pilot Sattler.
It also points out how much unreliable Willi Reschke's
war tales are.
At the end of the first part I discuss some objections that have been
made to my reconstruction.
The second part ("PART TWO: THE MYTH") explains the reasons why
improbable versions of the episode has been put forward for such a long time
from German side and links that to the reasons why Ta152 is likely the most
overrated and overhyped airplane ever.
It also shows how many unlikely (or plainly false) data have been spread
(and are usually repeated) about Ta152 achievements and performances.
PART
ONE: THE LUDWIGSLUST AERIAL COMBAT
ACCOUNTS
AND OTHER SOURCES.
WILLI RESCHKE's version,
from his book "Jagdgeschwader 301/302 "Wild
Sau" - In Defense of the Reich with the Bf
109, Fw 190 and Ta 152":
"Attacks by enemy fighter-bombers became more
frequent in the areas around the airfields, and Tempests were seen more
frequently. From Neustadt-Glewe we could see them
hanging in the air like hawks, ready to swoop down on anything that moved.
During the late afternoon hours on 14 April 1945 two of these aircraft were
seen attacking the railway line from Ludwigslust to
As our takeoff was in the same general diretion as the railway line, we reached the Tempests'
attack area shortly after takeoff. I was flying as
number three in the formation, and as we reached the area where the Tempests
were I saw Sattler's Ta 152 go down for no apparent reason. Now it was two
against two, and the low-level battle began.
The Termpest was known to be a very fast aircraft,
with which the English had been able to catch and shoot down the V-1. In this
engagement, however, speed played a less important role: at low level an
aircraft's maneuverability was more important. As I
approached, my opponent pulled up from a low-level attack and I attacked from
out of a left-hand turn.
Both pilots realized that this was a fight to the finish, and from the outset
both used every tactical and piloting ploy in an attempt to gain an advantage.
At that height neither could afford to make a mistake, and for the first time I
was able to see what the Ta 152 could really do.
Twisting and turning, never more than fifty meters above the ground, I closed
the range on the Tempest. At no time did I get the feeling that my machine had
reached the limit of it's performance. The Tempest
pilot quite understandably had to undertake risky maneuvers
to aviod a fatal burst from my guns. As my Ta 152
closed in on the Tempest, I could see that it was on the verge of rolling the
other way: an indication that it could not turn any tighter. The first burst
from my guns struck the Tempest in the rear fuselage and tail. The Tempest
pilot reacted by immediately flicking his aircraft into a right-hand turn,
which increased my advantage even further. There was no escape for the Tempest
now. I pressed the firing buttons again, but my guns remained silent.
Recharging them did no good: my guns refused to fire even a single shot. I
can't remember whom and what I cursed at that moment. Luckily the Tempest pilot
was unaware of my bad luck, for he had already had a sample. He continued to
twist and turn, and I positioned my Ta 152 so that he always had a view of my
machine's belly. Then came the moment when the Tempest went into a high-speed
stall: it rolled left and crashed into a wood. This combat was certainly
unique, having been played out at heights which were often just ten meters
above the trees and rooftops. Throughout I never had the feeling that my Ta 152
had reached its performance limit, instead it reacted to the slightest control
input, even though we were practically at ground level. Oberstleutnant
Auffhammer also gained the upper hand against his
Tempest, but in the end the enemy succeeded in escaping to the west. As the
combat had taken place just a few kilometers from the
airfield, in the late afternoon we drove out to the scene and discovered that Oberfeldwebel Sattler's Ta 152 and my Tempest had crashed
within 500 meters of each other. The treetops had absorbed some of the force of
the crash and the Tempest looked like it had made a forced landing. The damage
inflicted by my cannon shells was clearly visible on the tail and rear fuselage
and the pilot was still strapped in his cockpit. It turned out that he was a
New Zealander, Warrant Officer O.J. Mitchell of No.486 Squadron, Royal Air
Force. The next day the two fallen pilots were buried with military honors at Neustadt-Glewe cemetary.
For a long time that evening the crash of Oberfeldwebel
Sattler occupied the minds of the pilots and the many witnesses who had
observed the combat from the airfield. The engagement had not even begun when
Sattler went down, as both Tempest pilots were still busy with their low-level
attacks on the railway line and incapable of posing any threat to the Ta-152's.
Moreover he was too experienced a fox to place himself in a disadvantageious
position in such a situation. We could not find an explanation for his crash,
which will reamin a mystery forever. This was the
third crash of a Ta 152, and all were unexplained."
That version is also cited, almost exactly, in “JG301
Wilde Sau” book by Murawski and Neuwerth,
pg.77. That version is reported here too: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bf-109-vs-spitfire-vs-fw-190-vs-p-51-a-13369-6.html
.
Another WILLI RESCHKE's version (from John
Weal’s book “Fw 190 Aces of the Western Front”, pages
87/88):
" […] the Ta-pilots returned to Neustadt-Glewe without firing a shot. The aircraft were immediately
refuelled, taxied to their dispersals and camouflaged. The pilots were still
busy attending to their machines when two enemy fighters were spotted some
eight kilometres to the south-west of the field, making low-level passes over Ludwigslust railway yards. Three Ta 152 took off at once,
piloted by the Oblt. Aufhammer,
the Ofw. Sattler and myself. We were immediately in
contact with the enemy fighters, which turned out to be Tempests. Flying in n°3
position, I witnessed the Ofw. Sattler ahead of me
dive into the ground seconds before we reached them. It was hardly possible for
his crash to have been the result of enemy action, as the Tempest pilots had
clearly only just registered our presence. Now began a fight at two against two
at the ground-level, which was never to climb above 50 metres. At this altitude
neither could afford to make the slightest mistake. And for the first time
since flying the Ta 152 I began fully to appreciate exactly what this aircraft
could do.
"Pulling ever tighter turns, I got closer and
closer to one of the Tempests, never once feeling I was even approaching the
limit of the Ta’s capabilities. When he flicked over onto the opposite wing I
knew his last attempt to turn inside me had failed. My first burst of fire
caught the Tempest in the tail and rear fuselage; its pilot immediately engaged
its aircraft in a starboard turn, giving me an even greater advantage. I
pressed my gun buttons a second time, but after a few rounds my weapons fell
silent and refused to fire another shot. However, the Tempest, which had
already taken hits continued desperately to twist and turn, and I positioned
myself so that I was always just within his field of vision. Eventually,
inevitably, it stalled. The Tempest’s left wing dropped and he crashed into the
woods immediately below us, about one kilometre of the site from Sattler’s
crash. The Tempest pilot, the W/O O.J. Mitchell was buried side by side with
the Ofw. Sattler next day in Neustadt-Glewe cemetery with full military honours".
A third WILLI RESCHKE's version, in a somewhat
agreement with the previous ones apart the fundamental fact of Sattler
“being hit” (unknown source, quoted by Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Ta_152):
We reached the position at an altitude of 200 metres, just at the moment
when both Tempests after diving started climbing again. Just as the dogfight
was developing Sepp Stattler, on our side, was hit
and his plane fell like a stone out of the sky [...] The Tempest which I
attacked quickly reached the same height as me and was [at] approximately 10
o'clock before me. The dogfight began between 50 and 100 metres above ground
level and very often the wing tips passed close over the treetops.[...] The
whole fight was executed in a left-hand turn, the low altitude of which would
not allow for any mistakes. Ever so gradually I gained metre by metre on the
Tempest and after a few circles I had reached the most favourable shooting
position. [...] I pressed my machine-gun buttons for the first time [...] I
could see the Tempest for a short moment in straight ahead flight displaying
slightly erratic flying behaviour. But immediately she went straight back into
the left turn. [...] I sighted the Tempest very favourably in my cross-hairs
and could not have missed but my machine-guns experienced feeding problems. I
therefore tried to shoot it down with my cannon and forced her into a tight left-hand
turn from where she tipped out over her right wing and crashed into a forest.
RODERICH CESCOTTI, TO
(technical officer) of JG 301, version (from Peter Rodeike's
"Jagdflugzeug Fw
190" book, pages 416/417, as translated from the German and reported at http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/9611037326/p/1
; the original account was published on JAGERBLATT, Februar/Marz 1992):
“The Geschwaderführungskette
was on alert with four Ta 152H-1 and they scrambled to intercept four inbound
Tempest.
Three of those Tas were
involved into dogfights just after take-off, which ensued between ground and
4000m - without any evidence of the Tempest's superiority despite it's 4:3
advantage.
The fourth Ta 152 of Ofw.
Sepp Sattler had difficulties with it's starter and
therefore took off a few minutes after the leading Kette,
lead by Kommodore Oberstleutnant Fritz Aufhammer.
He climbed away, above the ongoing dogfight and dived
into the action.
Ofw
Sattler shot one Tempest out of the circling dogfight, but continued to dive
and hit the deck out of an altitude of about 2000m - there was no evidence of
an attempted recovery.
Another Ta 152, flown by Uffz
Willi Rescke, turned with a Tempest. Both were close
to the ground. reschke was on closest firing range,
yet he couldn't shoot as his weapons didn't fire. Suddenly, the Tempest flipped
over and hit the ground.
Now the odds were 3:2 in favor
of the Tas and the remaining two Tempests elected to
run away.
Our Kommodore was engaged in
dogfights at medium and high altitudes, but despite his experience he was
unable to get a kill.
After his landing, it became evident, that he flew on
the low-alt blower setting all the time.
The shifting-automatic malfunctioned and left Obstlt. Aufhammer flying at
reduced power. Despite this handicap, the Ta 152 still prove at least equal to
the Tempest under all circumstances.”
OFFICIAL RAF REPORTS
(from: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/tempest/temptest.html
,
scanning of the original Short and Shaw’s report
at http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/tempest/486-shaw-14april45.jpg
):
REPORT ABOUT THE FIGHT IN WHICH MITCHELL WAS SHOT DOWN:
PERSONAL COMBAT REPORT.
Date: 14th April, 1945.
W/O W.J. Shaw (N.Z.)
F/O S.J. Short (N.Z.)
Squadron: 486
Type & Mark of A/C: Tempest V.
Time Up & Down: 18.25 - 20.20
Place of Attack: Ludwigslust
area
Time of Attack: 19.30 hrs.
Height of own A/C on first sighting: 200 ft.
Height of enemy A/C on first sighting: 1000 ft.
Our casualties: 1 Tempest - W/O Mitchell. N.Y.R.
Enemy casualties: 1 FW. 190 destroyed W/O W.J.
Shaw
1
Cine camera used: yes
Personal Reports:
S.J Short's reports:
"I was flying pink 3 on an Armed Recce of the Perleberg-Ludwigslust area & together with my No. 2,
W/O Mitchell was pulling up from attacking Met north of Ludwigslust
when we saw 2 Me.109s at 100 ft & another 4 109s
at about 3000 ft. The 2 109s were coming in to attack us from port
rear-quarter. I called up & advised my No. 2 & instructed him to drop
his tanks. I broke port but could not quite get onto the tail of the loading
109 who started turning with me. A climbing turning match ensued & after 3
turns I was able to give the 109 a burst with about 45° off. The 109 flew
through & I observed 4 strikes aft of the cock-pit. I was unable to observe
further results because I had one 109 on my tail & another positioning to
attack. The last I saw of my No. 2 was from 6000 ft., when I saw him turning at
deck level with some 109s. Cine camera used. I claim 1 Me.109 damaged."
W.J. Shaw's reports:
"I was flying Pink 2 & whilst diving to
attack Met on a road about 10 miles east of Ludwigslust
I saw a single Fw.190 flying east at deck level. I reported this to Pink 1 who
ordered me to follow him in to attack. The 190 broke when we were out of range
& as I could see that my No.1 would be unable to attack I dropped my tanks
& climbed for height. As the E/A straightened out east I dived on it
passing my No. 1. This time the 190 broke rather later & again to port
& I was able to pull my bead through until he disappeared beneath my nose.
It was a full deflection shot & I opened fire when I judged I had 2 radii
deflection on him. I fired a long burst & then broke upwards to observe
results. As the 190 came in sight again I saw the flash of a strike just
forward of the cockpit. An instant later, flames appeared from the port side
&, enveloped in flames, the 190 went down in a gradual straight dive to the
deck. I saw it crash in a field & explode.
Cine camera used
I claim 1 Fw.190 destroyed."
ANOTHER PERSONAL REPORT, ALMOST ON THE SAME AREA AND
THE SAME DAY BUT DIFFERENT TIME, SO CERTAINLY UNRELATED WITH THE ACTION UNDER
CONSIDERATION:
F/Lt. Sheddan of 486
Squadron recorded in his Combat Report for 14 April 1945:
"I was flying pink 1 on a weather recce of the Perleberg - Ludwigslust area,
when just west of Ludwigslust, whilst pulling-up
after attacking a train I saw a silver colored a/c at
deck level flying due north.
My own height was 2000 ft
and I dived down behind it and gave chase followed by the other 3 a/c of my
section. When about 700 yards from it I recognized it was an F.W. 190. The 190
did not take any evasive action and I closed to a 100 yards and opened fire
with one second burst in dead line astern.
I saw large pieces come away from the wings and
fuselage and I pulled out to port of the 190 and slightly above. Looking back I
saw the starboard wing of the 190 drop and it rolled on its back, hit the
ground and exploded.
I claim 1 F.W. 190 Destroyed.
Cine Camera used."
According to “2nd TAF Vol. Three from Rhine to
Victory, Jan to May 45”, Shores and Thomas, pg 487, Sheddan shoot down the FW190 at 16:50, North of Ludwigslust, whrereas the battle
Sattler was involved in happened East of Ludwigslust
at about 19:20-19:30.
So, Sheddan’s fight and kill
seem completely unrelated with Ludwigslust battle
between Tempests and Ta152s.
RAF 2ND TAF'S VERSION OF THE ENCOUNTER:
"Wing Commander Brooker and and
three of the units pilots (486 squadron) were again after some rail targets ,
but were split up. At 19.30 Wt Off W.J.Shaw, who was in flying with Brooker, saw a lone
fighter, apparently a Fw 190 again, and shot this
down in flames after a brief combat. Meanwhile the other pair had been caught
by three more fighters whilst concentrating of strafing, and Wt Off O.J.Mitchell, a new pilot
with the unit, was shot down and killed. It was reported that his opponent may
have been a Bf 109 E - an obsolete type. Flg Off S.J
short fought with one of the others, which was also identified as a
Messerschmitt, claimed to have inflicted some damage on this. Their opponents
were certainly not flying Bf 109 E, but fighters of a much more 'exotic'
nature. The New Zealanders had been engaged by three members of Stab/JG301, a
unit which had recently been equipped with the initial examples of the Fw Ta 152, the ultimate development of the Fw 190 line to see operational service. In one of these, Ofw Willi Reschke had shot down
Mitchells Tempest over Ludwigslust at 1920, for his
25th victory, but in another of these fighters, Ofw
Sepp Sattler had been shot down and killed - almost certainly by Shaw."
(from the book “2nd TAF Vol. Three from Rhine to
Victory, Jan to May 45”, Shores and Thomas, pg 486,
also reported at http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/9611037326/p/1)
A NEW ZEALANDER JOURNALISTIC RECONSTRUCTION
(from http://www.nzfpm.co.nz/article.asp?id=fot_best):
Two of the Best
by: Ian Brodie
It was the 14th April 1945 and the war against Germany
was rapidly drawing to an end. A young New Zealander from Nelson, Warrant
Officer Owen Mitchell, had found that he was centre-stage to the death-throes
of a nation.
An excellent cricketer and sensitive musician,
Mitchell had joined the RNZAF in 1942 directly from University where he had
been studying engineering. At 20 years of age the young pilot transferred to
England where, after training, he started to accumulate flying hours as an instructor
and pilot with various Operational Training Units.
By early 1945 Mitchell had over 700 hours to his
credit and was converted onto the latest fighter in the RAF inventory - the
Hawker Tempest V. The next step was operational flying and he was delighted,
when in early March he found that he had been posted to No. 486 (NZ) Squadron
based at Volkel in
By early April the squadron had moved into Germany
itself and was using their base at Hopsten to harass
the enemy both in the air and on the ground.
At the German base of Neustadt-Glewe,
Oberfeldwebel Sattler was also delighted with his new
posting - to the elite Luftwaffe unit called the Stabsschwarm
(part of JG301). They were flying the latest German fighter and ultimate
development of the Focke Wulf
190 series of aircraft - the Ta-152.
At 6-25pm on the evening of the 14th Mitchell and
three others from his squadron took off on an armed reconnaissance of the area.
The section attacked a train north of Ludwigslust and
then became split up. The leader and his number two ordering Sid Short and Owen
Mitchell to make their own ways home.
Short and Mitchell, busily strafing along the rail
tracks nearby on their way home, came under the watchful eye of lookouts at
Neustadt-Glewe who immediately despatched three
Ta-152's to intercept. The pilots - Aufhammer,
Sattler and Reschke were on the scene in seconds.
Reschke
takes up the story;
"Flying in No.3 position I witnessed Oberfeldwebel Sattler ahead of me dive into the ground
seconds before we reached them. It seemed impossible for the crash to be from
enemy action."
Unknown to Reschke the New
Zealander Short had managed to fire at Sattler in a quick pass before being
attacked by Aufhammer. Friend and foe now started a
turning match that seemed to last forever. Neither could gain the advantage and
after 15 minutes the two pilots broke away and returned to their respective
bases - glad to be able to fly home in one piece.
In the meantime Reschke and
Mitchell were also in mortal combat;
"So now it was two against two as the ground
level dogfight began. We knew the Tempest to be a very fast fighter, used by
the British to chase and shoot down our V-1’s. But here, in a fight which was
never to climb above 50 metres, speed would not play a big part. The machines
ability to turn would be all important.
Pulling ever-tighter turns I got closer and closer to
the Tempest, never once feeling I was even approaching the limit of the Ta’s
capabilities. And in order to keep out of my sights the Tempest pilot was being
forced to take increasingly dangerous evasive action. When he flicked over onto
the opposite wing I knew his last attempt to turn inside me had failed.
The first burst of fire from my Ta-152 caught the
Tempest in the tail and rear fuselage.
The enemy aircraft shuddered noticeably and, probably
as an instinctive reaction, the Tempest pilot immediately yoked into a
starboard turn, giving me an even greater advantage.
Now there was no escape for the Tempest. I pressed my
gun buttons a second time, but after a few rounds my weapons fell silent, and
despite all my efforts to clear them, refused to fire another shot. I can no
longer remember just who and what I didn’t curse. But fortunately the Tempest
pilot did not recognise my predicament as he’d already taken hits.
Instead he continued desperately to twist and turn and
I positioned myself so that I was always just within his field of vision.
Eventually - inevitably he stalled. The Tempest’s left wing dropped and he
crashed into the woods immediately below us."
The young New Zealander was killed instantly and in a
quirk of fate his aircraft crashed less than 500 metres from the German pilot
Sattler. The Luftwaffe technicians recovered the two pilots’ bodies that
evening.
The next day Mitchell and Sattler were buried side by
side with full military honours in the Cemetery Neustadt-Glewe.
During the funeral Oberfeldwebel Willi Reschke stood guard of honour in front of the coffins.
It is fitting to end this story here by allowing these
two relatively unknown pilots - each flying arguably the most advanced piston-engined fighter produced by their respective nations to see
service in the air war over Western Europe - to represent the many thousands on
both sides who had gone before.
Footnote:
In 1947 the body of Owen James Mitchell was reinterred
in the
"We visited the area (now in the Russian Zone)
and found Body No. 1. This body was found to be clothed in khaki battledress
and had New Zealand marked on the shoulder. The socks were RAF blue and the
boots RAF escape type flying boots. On a handkerchief found in the pocket I
found the name Pettitt in print letters, about a
quarter inch high on the hem."
Owen Mitchell, the New Zealander from Nelson was
killed 18 days before the end of hostilities.
TEMPEST VICTORIES ON APRIL 14, 1945
(from http://www.hawkertempest.se/Victories.htm)
14 April Fw190 1
486
F/O C.J. Sheddan
SA-M (SN129) N Ludwigslust
14 April Fw190 1
486
W/O W.J. Shaw
SA-J (NV753) Ludwigslust
DISCOVERINGS AND OPINIONS ON WILLI RESCHKE'S (AND
OTHER GERMAN PILOTS) STORIES "RELIABILITY":
“Willi Reschke's JG 301/302
is one of the more interesting Luftwaffe unit histories. At the outset his text
was probably intended as a personal memoir - Reschke
"researched" and wrote the book behind the wall in East Germany - in
other words, documentary sources were in short supply.
One of the leading authorities on Reschke's
unit, JG 301, is French historian J-Y Lorant who
interviewed many former pilots and personnel of the Geschwader
during the 70's and 80's in the West. Re-examining the documentary sources that
he has collected over the decades for JG 301 he concludes that a number of Reschke's accounts are at variance with events as recalled
by other members of the Geschwader.
There is some doubt in particular about some victories
obtained at the controls of the revolutionary late war Ta 152.
This is perhaps not at all surprising given the chaos
and confusion at war's end.
For the record Reschke
states in his book for 24 April 1945 that engagements with Yak 9's during the
final throes of the Battle of Berlin resulted in four Yak 9's being shot down. In
poor visibility, two were claimed by himself and two by Obfw.
Walter Loos (in "Green 4"). The Stabsschwarm
lost Hptm. Hermann Stahl and his Ta152.
However when interviewed in the late 1970's Walter
Loos apparently stated that he had no victories - not a single enemy fighter
claim - while flying the Ta 152. Loos'claim is
evidently supported by reference to the personal diary of Fhr.
Ludwig Bracht written during March-April 1945 and the
letters of Uffz. Rudi Driebe.
Incidentally - & despite Jeff Ethell's account in
his Monogram Close Up - Archie Hagedorn never flew the Ta 152 in combat. By the
time Reschke came to compile his own account as
indicated a number of victories over Yak-9s have appeared.
The 'problem' may lie with Loos' log - a version of
the final page of his logbook that has circulated only shows flights 860 to 880
and also shows amendments in the form of sections pasted over each other. In Ofw. Willi Reschke's flight log
the last two lines are two entries recording missions in which victories are
reported in the 'Bemerkungen' column - this time
handwriting and inks appear to differ somewhat from earlier entries.
As mentioned above, Reschke
also describes the death in combat of Hptm. Stahl in
this same combat, 24 April 45 - other thus-far-unpublished JG 301 documentary
sources indicate that Stahl was shot down & killed on 11 April 1945. Ofw. Josef Keil was flying as his
wingman that day - an account from Keil appears
below. Of course most memoirs contain errors and omissions especially when
writing without the benefit of the latest research- or access to flight logs.
It is not my intention to 'slander' Reschke. Not only was he there, he has earned his place in
aviation history as a rare front-line pilot to fly combat sorties at the
controls of the Ta 152. His book is an intriguing account although the more
easily verifiable factual errors can be ascertained simply by comparing his
text with details of the same missions recorded in the large tomes published on
sister Wilde Sau unit JG 300. A very 'personal' account then...
[…]
The following interesting comments were received from
Russ Fahey;
"Hi Neil,
..As you have written, the final page of Loos' logbook
that has circulated only shows flights 860 to 880, and it does show sections
pasted over each other. However, there is a better copy available! This better
copy shows the entire page (#52), with all flights appearing (861 to 876). In
this version, there is no apparent cutting and pasting! It would seem that the
version you have seen (which I also have) was created by someone who
photographed the logbook (note the dark copy, probably due to a color photograph being copied on an old copy machine), and
then had to tape the left and right side photographs together to create a
contiguous document. But the cutting and pasting was not done by Loos! In
reality, the complete, non-pasted version of the page does not look very
suspicious at all. So I think you can eliminate this document in the
prosecution of Loos for false Ta-152 claims. However, since the other evidence
is so strong, I think you might still get a conviction without the smoking
logbook!......
"....Another problem with Loos's Flugbuch, which I have just discussed with Mr Lorant in an e-mail, is that Loos does not appear to have
flown with JG 300 after December 4, 1944. This is problematic because Loos
figures prominently as a witness in many of Dahl's claims from late 44 and
early 45, when Dahl was supposedly still flying with Stab/JG 300. So either
many of Dahl's claims during this period were bogus, or he flew alone and had
no witnesses! Considering the questionable nature of some of Dahl's
"victories", such as on Dec. 5, 1944, it would seem that the former
was more likely. On Dec. 5, for example, Dahl listed Loos as a witness, but Loos'
last flight with JG 300 was the day prior, Dec. 4, before he was posted out as
a flight instructor. His logbook shows no flights on Dec. 5, and indeed, none
between Dec. 4 and Dec 16, '44. (Incidentally, this page, #49, flights 801 to
820, may not be in the circulating Loos logbook with the patched up last page
(#52.) ......"
Thank you Russell for that interesting contribution !
“
(published by the WWII Luftwaffe blogger Falkeeins, at first on the now-defunct page: http://members.aol.com/falkeeins/Sturmgruppen/contents.html
and then re-wroted on: http://falkeeins.blogspot.it/2011/08/walter-loos-successful-ta-152-pilot.html
;
BTW, you can find here: http://falkeeins.blogspot.it/2010/04/towards-perfection-tank-ta-152-reschke.html some quite skeptical
considerations by Falkeeins about the “Ta152 superiority demonstrated by Ludwigslust fight”)
Also look at:
QUOTE --------------
(PeterEvans Admin @
Jun 23 2007, 10:50 AM)
[*]24 April 1945 - engagements with Yak 9's during the
------------- END QUOTE
...some interesting comments via J-Y Lorant who is
currently revising his Fw 190 Docavia
tome and who has been re-examining the documentary sources that he has
collected over the decades for JG 301 - his conclusion; Reschke's
account of the combats of 24 April 1945 doesn't stand up to scrutiny -
that's even before looking at the Russian sources. Firstly - and most
surprisingly perhaps - there is Walter Loos own declaration that he failed
to shoot down a single enemy fighter while flying the Ta 152 - personal interview
1979, Loos, Driebe and Bracht.
This startling piece of info is apparently confirmed by reference to the
personal diary of Fhr. Ludwig Bracht
written during March-April 1945 and the letters of Uffz.
Rudi Driebe. Seems that Loos was truthful in front of
his old comrades but Bracht and Driebe
passed away in 1982-83 as I understand which left no-one on hand to correct Reschke's apparently fanciful account...
The problem with Loos as I understand it was that he would never reveal the
last page of his flight log to researchers,starting
with J-B Frappé in 1979 - the suggestion is that
these two (or three) Ta 152 victories are invention - who's exactly I wouldn't
like to say. Secondly, Reschke's account of Hptm. Stahl's death in this same combat, 24 April 45 -
other thus far unpublished JG 301 documentary sources confirm that Stahl was
shot down & killed on 11 April 1945, Ofw. Josef Keil flying as his wingman that day.
a couple of other points have come out of this too - Hagedorn - quoted by Ethell in the Monogram Close up - never flew the Ta 152 in
combat, while Bracht also had no combat sorties, only
airfield circuits..
All the above came out of a discussion regarding a new article to be published
on the Ta 152 due to appear in Chris Ehrengardt's
re-launched Aérojournal magazine..(issue 1 is due out
in December )”
(from : http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=22979
)
CONSIDERATIONS:
When did it happen?
First of all,
sometimes this Ludwigslust aerial combat is said to
have been happened on April 15, 1945 (for example, in Harmann’s
book on Ta152).
Having an official
RAF report about the date of the fight where Mitchell was killed, we can be
sure that the correct date is April 14, 1945.
How many planes were involved into the dogfight?
- Reschke's story
talks about a 3 TAs vs 2 Tempests dogfight (with one TA supposedly out
of the game just before the start of the battle).
- Cescotti's version
talks about a 4 vs 4 battle (with Aufhammer, Reschke, Sattler and another unnamed and so far
unidentified pilot, I'll call him "NN"), with one of the Ta152s
taking off with a delay of some minutes and independently reaching the battle
area (which was less than ten kilometers away from
the German airfield).
- Cescotti’s version
depicts a dogfight that initially is 4 Tempests vs 4 Ta152, then Sattler
“shots one Tempest out of the circling dogfight” (this is just a
completely wrong guess, as we’ll see, because that Tempest was likely Shaw
catching Sattler by surprise!) but crashes, so it remains a 4 vs 3
dogfight (because Sattler has crashed) but it seems that also one Tempest
doesn’t join the fight, so it should be a 3 vs 3. In fact later,
after Mitchell has been shooted down, the fight ends
with “the remaining two Tempests” that run away, escaping from
the three remaining Ta152s (“Now the odds were 3:2 in favor of the Tas”).
We’ll see that (except for Cescotti’s completely
wrong guess about Sattler “shooting one Tempest out of the circle”),
this account is fully explained by the hypothesis I’m showing here. Just to
anticipate my conclusions, the “remaining two Tempests” are Short
(obviously …) and almost surely Shaw, whereas Brooker is the fourth Tempest,
that really never joined the fight.
- Cescotti’s version
has in fact that very reveailing detail: he
says that at the end of the fight, after the downing of Mitchell, there were two
remaining Tempests (“the remaining two Tempests elected to run away”).
So, according
to Cescotti (and contrary to Reschke’s
tale), more than a couple of Tempests (the pair Short-Mitchell) was involved
into the fight. And saying that “two” (and not “three”!) Tempests were
still into the action at the end also is a clue that just three Tempests
(not just two and not all four) took part to the dogfight.
I could bet that
these three Tempests were Short, Mitchell and Shaw, whereas Brooker
didn’t join the battle.
- RAF version on the whole talks about a 4 vs
4 battle too, with the first pair of Tempests (Brooker and Shaw) pursuing
(and downing) a lonely E/A (likely a Ta152) and the other pair (Short and
Mitchell ) facing three others TAs.
Also original RAF
pilots' reports show 4 Tempest involved into that action, splitted in two pairs.
- RAF / RAF pilots and Cescotti's versions are in better agreement between
them than with Reschke's story: same number of planes
for each side (4 vs 4), one TA and one Tempest on a 1-1 dogfight (Reschke vs Mitchell), another couple fighting (Short vs Aufhammer), a third couple involved (Shaw and Sattler,
although Cescotti misunderstands what happened) and
the remaining two pilots not really fighting (NN present but not fighting,
Brooker even not joining the fight).
Are German reports reliable and consistent when compared each other?
- Reschke’s story is
in fact more than one version, although usually in very good agreement between
them.
But with one
considerable exception: in one of them he clearly states that “Sepp Stattler, on our side, was hit and his plane fell
like a stone out of the sky”!
So it could be
that even that fundamental detail has been “revised” by Reschke,
in the course of time.
For some
reasons, that could be the lack of citation in Wikipedia but that I think
mainly related to the “myth building” I’ll examine later, this very relevant
detail has been “forgot” in the debate: always invariably, the quoted and
reported Reschke version is just the one that says
that Sattler crashed for no apparent reason.
So, even in
this close examination I’ll consider that as the usual “German version”: an
inexplicable crash due to some aircraft failure. And this is the version I’m
going to deny.
But I think
that even that “omission” could be revealing …
- Reschke's story (2nd
version) is not coherent with Cescotti's
version when saying he (Reschke) flew behind
Sattler and saw him crashing just before the attack. Cescotti's
and Shaw's stories are in good consistency with the picture of Sattler arriving
late on the battle area, speeding up, maybe climbing a little and possibly
diving (how much remains to be seen, I think not much) to attack E/As but being
caught by surprise by Shaw.
It's probable
that Reschke really saw Sattler falling, at least
with the corner of the eye. But it's not possible at all that Reschke flew behind Sattler during the flight from the
airfield to the battle zone, if we had to believe to Sattler's delay in takeoff (which is a particular that a technical officer
like Cescotti should remember more easily than the
German ace, also considering that one of his duties was just to solve technical
troubles!).
- Cescotti's report
that talks about "a few minutes" of delay in Sattler's take-off is
not consistent with him crashing "after a dive from 2000m", when
compared with Reschke and Shaw's accounts. I’ll
examine this very interesting issue later.
- Reschke's story is
not coherent with Cescotti's version when
talking about Reschke weapons failure: according to Reschke he managed to fire some shots (one burst and almost
one half more) whereas according to Cescotti he
simply didn’t fire. Considering that Cescotti was a
technician, he was in the position to check Reschke’s
weapons after the mission, counting the shots fired and verifying any
failure. Cescotti isn’t clear about failure
verification but is clear when says “he couldn't shoot as his weapons didn't
fire“. So it’s possible that Reschke (which
frankly doesn’t seems to me a quite reliable person, maybe in good faith but
not much trustable), didn’t fired any shot.
Obviously, to
say
“My
first burst of fire caught the Tempest […] I pressed my gun buttons a second
time, but after a few rounds my weapons fell silent and refused to fire another
shot […] I positioned myself so that I was always just within his field of
vision […] he crashed into the woods”
sounds much
better than just
“I wasn’t able
to fire a single shot, but I induced him to make a mistake and he crashed”.
Also for victory
assignment, I believe …
But we have to
remember that Reschke, in some of his many versions,
said that after the fight the wreck of Mitchell’s plane shown “clearly
visible bullet holes”, so we should give him some credit here, although
with caution.
It could be
possible that Cescotti’s statement really means “Reschke’s weapons couldn’t fire more than a few shots”.
In the end, I think
Reschke likely hit Mitchell with a few shot, even if
not critically.
- Considering that Cescotti
was a grounded technical officer, the details he gives about the dogfight are
surely "second hand" details, i.e. heard from pilots after that
mission.
An hypothesis
could be, as someone says, he eyewitnessed the
dogfight from Glewe-Neustadt with binoculars, but
remember that according to Reschke the Tempests were
spotted “some eight kilometres to the south-west of the field, making
low-level passes over Ludwigslust railway yards”
(that was just the mission they have) so it’s likely that they were still about
at that distance, flying on their targets (just like Short says, they were
pulling up after strafing).
How easy is to
watch and understand a low-altitude dogfight far away eight kilometers, even using binoculars, at dusk?
Anyway, there
is another stronger reason to be highly skeptical
about Cescotti’s description of Sattler’s flight at
combat area and it doesn’t involves binoculars or naked eye at all …
We’ll examine
it later.
- On the contrary, technical details about the planes'
issues (Sattler's starter, Reschke's guns, Aufhammer's supercharger) are more likely Cescotti’s genuine "first hand" reports,
although (as I'll explain later) I have some doubts about the truthfulness of
his account of Aufhammer's supercharger failure.
I think is
also likely that, being assigned to technical support to the planes, he could
remember well the number of pilots and planes involved in that mission from
German side.
- Cescotti's account
says "Ofw Sattler shot one Tempest out of the
circling dogfight" (that could have lead the New Zealander
author Ian Brodie (see further on), in case he knew Cescotti’s
report, to think that Sattler had a turning fight with the only Tempest that
could have turned with him, i.e. Short , since Mitchell at the same time was
under attack by Reschke).
But shooting
out doesn't mean at all "turn fighting". I think, quite simply, that Cescotti heard the post-combat account by a German pilot
reporting that Sattler was engaged with a single enemy (Shaw) and draw the
conclusion that the German had (“obviously” ...) the initiative (whereas the
truth was the opposite!).
I think that Cescotti based his account on Aufhammer
or NN reports, who probably briefly noticed Shaw’s Tempest, not Reschke's one.
Please note
that Reschke don’t mention at all any fight between
Sattler and any E/A, whereas Cescotti says that
Sattler did that (“shot out one Tempest”), although briefly: Reschke seems to have missed many relevant
details, both about the scrambling take-off and the fighting itself!
It’s a shame
we have no account from Aufhammer or from the “NN”
pilot, I think that quite likely they could have recorded more and better
details than Reschke.
In particular,
it seems NN wasn’t directly involved in fights and he could have been detected
Shaw’s presence: I think it’s likely that some details of Cescotti’s
tale rely on his testimony.
Are British reports reliable and consistent when compared each other?
- S.J. Short's report talks about a 2 vs 2
dogfight in the beginning, with 4 more E/A spotted. In the end Short is
attacked by two E/A while he is dogfighting with a third E/A he has just
damaged. This fully disagrees with Reschke's story,
because just two TAs should remain after Sattler's crash, according to Reschke's version. On the contrary, this agrees with the
idea that the pair Short-Mitchell faced three TAs (Aufhammer,
Reschke, and the unnamed pilot) just while Shaw dealt
with Sattler.
- S.J. Short wrote “The last I saw of my No.
2 was from 6000 ft., when I saw him turning at deck level with some
109s”. He says “some”, not “one”.
Since at that
moment, according to his report, he was engaged in a climb-and-turn fight with another
Ta152H (almost certainly Aufhammer), this absolutely
reinforces the picture that after Sattler’s crash there were three
remaining Ta152H and not two. Once more the Reschke’s
version is denied.
- S.J Short's recognition of "Me109"
is an obvious a mistake, more evident when you consider Shaw's report
that talks about FW.190 (it was likely a Ta152H, an obvious and understandable
oversight by Shaw: he and his colleagues never saw a Ta152H before!). Please
take note that the RAF personal reports document consider that attack as a
single action, on the same area at the same time. So it seems to me unlikely
there were "mixed" German unities with plane types other than Ta152
or Fw190 involved.
Also the Sheddan's report on his weather recce, on the same day and
the same area (no information available about the time), talks about another
FW190 and not a Me109.
Moreover,
according to Reschke memories (not something to swear
by, however …) at one occasion Ta152s weren’t identified by Bf109s pilots and
were attacked! (http://www.ww2f.com/weapons-wwii/12510-flying-152-a.html#post151810
) Likely, those Ta152s were mistaken for P-51s, a kind of fighter with some
resemblance with a 109.
And neither Reschke nor any another German report
relates about the participation of their comrades flying 109 (really, there is
no report of any other German plane fighting there besides the four
Ta152s!).
- Recognition of "other four Me109 at 3000ft"
by Short could be explainable by:
a) a real identification of 4 enemy planes (and they couldn’t even be Me109!)
in the nearby at the beginning of the fight, that surely didn’t took part to
the battle
b) a simple mistake by Short in the excitation of the imminent fight (4 E/A
erroneously "spotted" instead of just 2 more)
c) the erroneous identification of the remaining two Tempests (Brooker and
Shaw) and at least one of the remaining two TAs (the unnamed German pilot and
maybe also Sattler, if the latter managed to climb up to about 1000ft before
being downed), still flying in the first phase of the battle, as four E/A.
Considering
that after contacting the two "Me109" and shooting to (almost
certainly) Aufhammer, Short was attacked by other TWO
E/A, for sure one more E/A must have joined Aufhammer
and Reschke. Besides that, the Tempests flight splitted in two pairs before the fight and they probably
lost sight of each other.
So, one simple
explanation of the "four Me109 at 3000ft" is that Short saw the
two returning Tempests (Shaw climbed up to gain height to attack Sattler,
Brooker likely climbing too) and the other two Ta152s (or at least just
one of the Ta152s, if he mistaken the count by one), with one of these planes
actually being the "unnamed German Ta152 pilot", previously flying at
some distance and height from his comrades (maybe still higher simply because
being the third of the attacking Tas he has still to
start the dive), that later joined his mates against Short.
The other
plane could have been Sattler himself, climbed up from lower level while
looking for the battle (3000 ft is just about 1000m,
so it’s just a little bit higher of what can be considered “deck”).
Remember that
Short and Mitchell were flying really low (100-200ft), so Short’s estimation of
“3000ft” could be not fully accurate and moreover could not reflect the height
of all those four planes. It could just mean “all these planes were
higher than me, but not so much”.
But even the other two hypothesis explaining the mistake could be true.
To summarize it:
- an easy explainable error in plane identification (Ta152s mistaken for
Me109s), like a lot of similar mistakes done during the war
- an error in identifying planes participating to the fight (mixed
between enemies and friends) OR other four fully unrelated planes
that passed at some distance and just went their own way without joining the
battle
For sure, if additional four (!) Me109 were there, it’s a miracle that
Short saved his neck, surrounded by so many enemies! 
BTW, are we sure that Mitchell has been shot down by Reschke
(with malfunctioning guns!) and not by one of those supposed Me109? 
Ok, I’m joking (and fooling some half-wit Ta152 fans), but frankly speaking: there
is no mystery here, just identification and maybe numbering mistakes by a pilot
caught by surprise, having just a few instant to try to realize the best way to
save his life.
There is NO clue that any other German plane apart the Ta152s
took part to that fight, let alone (four) Me109s!
Any dumbass claiming that, really deserves to be mocked.
Moreover, if it would be true that some 109s took part to that fight, in
an active way, the unavoidable conclusion would be that the German
pilots, at least Reschke and Aufhammer,
if not also Cescotti, are downright liars,
because they never did any mention of 109s involved into that battle.
Really, I don’t think at all that they are so blatantly lying, because
actually there were NO Me109 involved
into that battle.
I’ve even read a statement, made by one particularly stupid
Ta152-wunder-waffen fan, that Short really damaged a 109 and not Aufhammer: his brainless idiocy is so big that, while
trying to “defend the reputation” of his worshipped invincible plane, he
didn’t realize he is fully undermining the reputation of those Ta152’s pilots
that, on the other end, he energetically defends and try to build an unlikely
“reconstruction” onto their controversial tales (especially on Reschke’s one)!
- W.J. Shaw's report talks just about 1 (downed)
E/A. It seems that the E/A was flying lonely, so it could be plausibly
Sattler's plane that was reaching the battle area having taken off late.
- There is no reasonable doubt that Shaw downed
an E/A (he saw it being hit by his shots, then burning and crashing just after
his attack), at least if we don't want charge him of blatant lying.
But remember that
Shaw, like Short, used cine camera, as he wrote on his report …
The only
reasonable doubt could be if it really was Sattler's Ta152 and not
another FW190, maybe unrelated with Stab/JG301. Of course it's possible but I
think that is unlikely, since the four Tempest had to be close enough to be in
the same area when JG301 four-plane flight arrived.
Some doubt on
the downed plane identity could be cast if there were another FW190 loss in Ludwigslust area, on the same day and at the same time. I
was unable to find out such a loss apart the FW190 downed by Sheddan, which has a separate report, regards the area at
N-W of Ludwigslust (and not S-E) and is surely a
distinct case also because it happened more than two hours before the battle
here examined.
This reinforces the likelyhood that the downed
"FW190" was in reality Sattler's Ta152H.
In 2016 an
alternative explanation has been proposed, highly speculating about a FW190
shot-down in a quite different area, likely same day but at unknown time, with
very scarce info and having a lot of shortcomings, so I don’t think at
it as a reliable explanation at all (see the section “The Skupina hypothesis”).
- Shaw’s identification of the the Ta152H as a “FW190” is even more easily and fully
explainable than Short’s erroneous recognition as a “BF109”: the Ta152 was a
new fighter, unknown to Allies pilots. By recognizing it as a “FW190”, Ta152
predecessor and the most similar plane of all, Shaw’s actually demonstrated to
be good in identifying enemy aircraft types.
- It seems that Brooker didn't partecipate actively to the battle (he was even in bad
position to attack the lonely FW190) and that all the pilots quickly disengaged
just after Mitchell's downing and/or Short shooting to his adversary.
- no radio communication between Luftwaffe
pilots is reported in any of the German accounts, so we have no additional clue
from them. For sure, there is no report of a possible communication by Sattler
to his comrades about his delay or about his flight path or about any trouble
he had with the plane.
This also means that we have no clue that other German planes were asked for
aid from the Ta152s pilots and this further reduces the chance that other
fighters joined that fight. That, in turn, further reduces the chance that the
FW190-like fighter shot down by Shaw wasn’t Sattler.
On the
contrary, RAF reports mention brief communications but just between the pilots
of each couple and just between the shooting. If there were Allies’ radio
warnings about the upcoming battle, between the two couple, they didn’t
reported them. My opinion is that after having been engaged by Germans nor
Short neither Mitchell had really the time to talk by the radio during the
fight and that Brooker and Shaw maybe didn’t even noticed the turning fight in
which the other couple was involved. If the reconstruction by Ian Brodie is
well-founded where he write “the leader and his number two ordering Sid
Short and Owen Mitchell to make their own ways home”, one could argue that
Brooker and Shaw (having heard no help call) thought their comrades were
already far from the battle zone.
- The dogfight between Short and his opponents
developed from 200 ft to 6000 ft
at least, according to his report. This could account for Cescotti's
statements "Three of those Tas were involved
into dogfights just after take-off, which ensued between ground and 4000m"
and "Our Kommodore was engaged in dogfights
at medium and high altitudes". So, Reschke's
account of a "two against two at the ground-level" is correct just
for himself vs Mitchell for all the time and for Short vs another Ta152 (almost
certainly Aufhammer) just at the beginning of the
fight.
- The statement, written by Ian Brodie in the
New Zealander site, "Unknown to Reschke the
New Zealander Short had managed to fire at Sattler in a quick pass before being
attacked by Aufhammer" is hardly credible,
because it doesn't agree with Short's own description: he had a (relatively)
long climb-and-turn fight before firing to his adversary, then he
disengaged quickly when chased by the remaining Ta152s. Short doesn’t mention
any other previous shooting against an E/A, and it’s unlikely he wouldn’t have
reported that into his personal report.
I think that
the author (Ian Brodie) just made a wrong supposition, thinking that Short
was the only Allied pilot that could have shoot to Sattler: he has
forgotten Shaw and Brooker, just like probably did the four German pilots!
The missing "NN pilot"
According to Harmann book on Ta152 ("Focke-Wulf
Ta152", Schiffer Publishing, 1999, pg.106), the pilots listed from 1 to 13
in the following list were the operational pilots within JG301 (at least those
whose name is known).
I added some infos, some more (unchecked!) names from other sources
(from 14 to 17) and corrected some Harmann’s book
inaccuracies:
1. Maj. Guth
2. Obstlt. Fritz Aufhammer (5 victories)
3. Oblt. Schallenberg
4. Lt. Dietrich Reiche
(8 victories)
5. Hptm. Hermann Stahl
(killed in air combat 24-4-45 according to Reschke,
on 11-4-45 acording other sources)
6. Obfw. Sepp Sattler
(killed in air combat 14-4-45)
7. Obfw. Josef Keil (16 victories, four of them claimed on Ta152H)
8. Obfw. Walter Loos
(38 victories, including 22 heavy bombers and 8 Soviet aircraft; please note
that, contrary to a widespread belief, he had no victories while flying Ta152,
by his own declaration)
9. Obfw. Willi Reschke (26 victories including 18 heavy bombers)
10. Obfw. Herbert Stephan
(8 victories)
11. Fw. Christof “Bubi” Blum (6 victories)
12. Obfhr. Jonny Wiegeshoff (killed in the crash of his Ta152 on 14.3.45)
13. Uffz. Hermann Durr (killed in the crash of his Ta152 on 1.2.45)
14. Rudi Michaelis (see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=19930
)
15. Hans Fay (see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=19984
)
16. Erich Brunotte (see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=32152
)
17. Uffz. Ludwig Bracht (see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=19902
, although it seems he never flown Ta152 in combat, see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=22979)
So it could be
possible to identify the fourth German
pilot, having the original documentation related to that mission or pilots’
logbooks. It seems quite strange to me that nobody has shown any evidence about
that name, probably Cescotti himself didn't
remembered that.
It’s another
clue that those German reports are based mainly on memories and not on
documents.
BTW, Harmann’s book mistakenly report 15-4-45 as the date for
the Ludwigslust combat.
Also notheworthy is the fact on 17 known pilots to have flown
Ta152 (for some of them is not clear if in action too), 7 were aces.
I
cross-checked infos with various sites, the above
linked and others, in particular:
http://jpgleize.club.fr/aces/ww2ger.htm
http://www.asisbiz.com/Aces_Luftwaffe.html
http://www.luftwaffe.cz/reschke.html
http://www.luftwaffe.cz/keil.html
Why Sattler’s Ta152H crashed?
Please note
that in NO report, nor from Allies neither from German side, any flak
is mentioned. This should reasonably exclude "friendly fire" as
a possible cause for Sattler's crash (as someone has suggested).
So, Sattler
could have been downed by an E/A or crashed for a mechanical failure.
The second
explanation (which is the usual German one, even if in reality they don't give any
explanation ...) is indeed possible, especially with a plane so plagued by
teething problems as the Ta152H was.
Anyway, the
two other pilots of JG301 that died in crashes due to failures (on production
planes) were flying in very different conditions than Sattler (Uffz. Hermann Durr, entered a
flat spin and crashed on 1.2.45; Obfhr. Jonny Wiegeshoff, stalled and crashed on 14.3.45 when approaching
for landing, see the book “Focke Wulf
Ta 152” by Dietmar Harmann,
Schiffer Publishing, pages 101/102).
I think that the E/A cause is more likely, at last if a credible
candidate for the "killer" role is found.
I think that
W/O W.J. Shaw is a VERY credible candidate.
SO,
THIS IS MY PICTURE OF WHAT LIKELY HAPPENED:
Tempests flight before the dogfight
- Four
Tempests (Brooker and Shaw in the first pair, Short and Mitchell in the
second pair) were flying in the Ludwigslust area,
attacking ground targets north and east of the town (very likely the railways
and the roads alongside them).
Both pairs
were flying at low-level, but Short and Mitchell were pulling up after an
attack, whereas Brooker and Shaw were still diving (apparently against other ground
targets to S-E).
- The position
of Short and Mitchell was almost certainly on the North-East side of Ludwigslust (according to Short report and Reschke tale too) and they were heading South (in fact the
Germans, coming from Neustadt-Glewe, at N-W, attacked
them from their left and rear side).
- At the same
time, Brooker and Shaw were beginning a dive to strafe ground targets on roads
and railways that runs from Ludwigslust for some
miles south-east of the town.
I suppose that
they were passing East of Ludwigslust ahead of the
other couple, in search of ground targets, likely on the road the runs
south-east alongside the railway to Grabow.
Remember that
according to RAF the mission targets were the railways and according to Short’s
report they were flying and strafing on “Perleberg-Ludwigslust
area” : Perleberg is just 20 miles S-E of Ludwigslust, beyond Grabow and Karstadt, so it could be that Shaw’s account of “10
miles east of Ludwigslust” just means an
approximate position “between Perleberg and Ludwigslust”.
If Brooker and
Shaw would have been already positioned on the outmost point at ten miles S-E,
the two couples should have been separated by about that distance, but if
Brooker and Shaw were just beginning the S-E dive to fly over the road at low
level (as it seems from Shaw’s report) or if they were already returning N-W
for a second strafing run or if Short and Mitchell were already south of Ludwigslust following the other couple, they (and notably
Shaw) could have been much nearer to the other couple, maybe just a few miles
(remember that at 450 km/h even 5 or 6 miles could be covered in a little more
than 1 minute).
The fact that
Shaw, committed to a railway strafing mission, mentions strafing “a road”
makes probable he was flying on the road that runst
alongside the railway between Ludwigslust up till Grabow,
just four miles S-E.
TA152s flight before the dogfight (and the “peculiar” Sattler’s flight
path)
- Three Ta152,
flown by Aufhammer, Reschke
and NN (unidentified pilot) scrambled at once from Neustadt-Glewe
to intercept the Tempests.
- A fourth
Ta152 (Sattler) took off a few minutes after and flown to the battle
separated by the other three.
- Sattler DIDN'T
climbed up until at least 2000 m, as Cescotti's
report suggests, to join the fight. He has to flown much lower
and almost horizontally, in order to regain the time previously
lost at take-off. Considering all the clues, I think that he likely never
climbed higher than 1000m/3000ft, likely much less and maybe did so just in the
last moments, trying to spot his teammates.
Then he
managed to arrive near to Short and Mitchell about at the same time of his
comrades, unaware that he has been spotted by Shaw.
Sattler’s Ta152 is shot down by Shaw
- The first
Tempest pair (Brooker and Shaw) were diving when Shaw spotted Sattler's Ta152,
east (almost certainly north-east) of their position.
Brooker and
Shaw Tempests were south-east of Ludwigslust, whereas
Sattler was coming from north-east and, trying to join his comrades, was
directing towards the other pair (Short and Mitchell) which was probably at a
slightly northern position.
The behavior of Sattler’s (presumed) plane, as later described
by Shaw, suggests that he was turning alternatively to W and to E, likely
trying to spot where his comrades were.
- Brooker
(which, being No.1, was probably leading the dive and was already at low level)
was unable to pull up quickly and pursue the Ta152
- So Shaw
took the initiative, stopping the dive, dropping tanks, heading north-east,
gaining height and then diving onto the German (which at that point was
probably looking for his comrades, that were positioning themselves to attack
Short and Mitchell).
According to
Shaw’s report, Sattler at first headed W, then E, then turned again to W or N-W
(maybe he finally spotted his comrades that direction), exposing port side to
Shaw.
Sattler was
hit by Shaw with a good deflection shot and was downed in flames, diving and
crashing.
His crash was
noticed by the other German pilots, that (at least some of them, certainly Reschke) were equally unaware of Shaw and Brooker, hence Reschke disbelief about a possible enemy action against
Sattler.
Remember:
according to Reschke report, they had an eye on the
only two Tempests they thought were involved into the action, they weren't
aware of the other two!
But I think that
Aufhammer or, more likely, the NN pilot could have
spotted Shaw too, before the end of the fight, this explains why Cescotti talks about two Tempests remaining at the
end.
Since nor
Brooker neither Shaw attacked the remaining three Ta152, it’s possible that
they even didn’t saw them just like Reschke didn’t
saw Shaw, so confirming that Sattler flown (and was downed) at a certain
distance by Reschke.
Mitchell’s Tempest is shot down by Reschke
- At the same
time, the other three Ta152s spotted the Tempest just at the time they
arrived on the battle area (Reschke writes:
“We were immediately in contact with the enemy fighters”) and,
after having dived to deck, attacked Short and Mitchell by rear, at very
low level (about 100ft). Likely it was Kommodore Aufhammer that led the attack, aiming at Short’s Tempest,
whereas Reschke attacked Mitchell and NN
(the unnamed pilot) followed him (maybe not immediately, it’s
possible that he stayed higher for some moments, I even suspect he could catch
a glimpse of Sattler being attacked by Shaw; this could accont
for a second-hand tale by Cescotti, about Sattler
that “shot one Tempest out of the circling dogfight” and “the
remaining two Tempests“).
Short
managed to gain height and started a turning fight against Aufhammer,
from the deck up to 4000m (according to Cescotti;
from Short’s report we know he climbed up to about 6000ft/2000m at least).
Mitchell
was unable to do so, then was slightly damaged by Reschke
and crashed (maybe more for a stall or a wrong manoeuvre than for having being
critically hit; it’s even possible that Reschke
didn’t fired at all, even if in one of his often unreliable tales he says the
Tempest wreck was found to have bullet holes, so we could give him some credit
on this point).
Mitchell was a
pilot with almost no combat experience, flying the Tempest and being on the
front-line since no more than a month and half (http://www.nzfpm.co.nz/article.asp?id=fot_best
).
On the
contrary, Reschke was already an ace (24 victories at
that moment, two more in the following days), with almost ten months of hard
fighting at the front (http://www.luftwaffe.cz/reschke.html
).
I think that
Mitchell's fate was signed at the moment he started turning at low height and
low speed, having to face a German ace (and one more Ta152) when flying a
tricky plane in that condition.
The battle between Short, Aufhammer, Reschke and “NN” pilot (and the defense
of Aufhammer’s reputation)
- At a
slightly higher altitude, after 3 turns Short succeeded to damage Aufhammer, but was forced to break by the arrival of Reschke and the NN pilot that, after Mitchell's downing,
climbed up and joined Short and Aufhammer at the
turning dogfight (in fact, Short reports he had "one 109 [an
obvious identification mistake here] on my tail & another positioning to
attack").
- Cescotti says that Aufhammer's
Ta152 had a failure on the supercharger setting (asserted to be locked on low-alts setting), so he was unable to
get a kill. Strangely, he don't mention any damage on Aufhammer's
plane, notwithstanding the fact he was certainly hit by Short (and by more
than a shot, Short reports about four). This brings me to have some suspects
about Cescotti’s account on this point.
My opinion is
that Aufhammer damage was only of moderate entity, but
he probably would have been downed by Short if the other two Ta152s wouldn't
have helped him.
Aufhammer is
ranked as an "ace" having five victories (http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7886
), that is a quite moderate achievement for an experienced German pilot!
On the other
side, Short had at least one victory on the Tempest, a FW190 downed on
December 27, 1944, in the Münster area (http://www.hawkertempest.se/Victories.htm
).
Also look at
this interesting citation: "Oberstleutnant
Fritz Aufhammer was the official Kommodore
but was mainly an administrator" (http://www.airartnw.com/jg301.htm
).
And here is
reported an account of Josef Keil that, talking about
an action against some P-47s on April 10, 1945, quite clearly shows that Aufhammer had little combativeness: “Gesticulating just as vigorously as I had, the 'boss' [i.e. Aufhammer] made it quite plain that if I wanted to go down
after the P-47s then I was on my own”
http://falkeeins.blogspot.it/2010/04/towards-perfection-tank-ta-152-reschke.html
Frankly speaking, considering that Cescotti doesn’t
mention at all any damage on Aufhammer’s plane, I
think that Cescotti could lie about the
failure, just to justify the lack of any combat results by his Kommodore (quite a bad thing for a formally
"chief" in a desperate Luftwaffe headed towards the defeat, with
chiefs very likely risking the Court Martial in case of suspected cowardice,
remember that during the last months of war about 5000 german
soldiers were shot by firing squad for desertion and cowardice).
This could also explain the missing info about the damages suffered by the Kommodore’s Ta152, to put all the blame on the “failure”
and to exalt Kommodore’s “skill” in spite of that
trouble.
By the way, as
I’ll explain later, Short’s report shows that even if the failure would be
real (I think it wasn’t), Aufhammer wouldn’t have
suffered any significant performance damage during the fight to explain his
poor outcome, because his plane was still at low altitude when he was hit by
Short.
Also revealing
of that “protecting” attitude by his comrades is Reschke’s
statement that in the dogfight Aufhammer “gained
the upper hand” (!) on Short, a
fact that is plainly denied by Short’s report (and please remember that
Short used his cine camera, so we have to be confident about his account
of Aufhammer being hitten
by his guns) and even by Cescotti’s one.
- Please note
that if we accept all the details given by the German reports, we have
to draw the conclusion that in the same short action there were 4 failures
on three Ta152s out of four!
1) Sattler
starter 2) Sattler’s unknow deadly failure 3) Aufhammer’s supercharger failure 4) Reschke’s
weapons failure
Possible but
unlikely, even for Ta152H …
I obviously
have no proof, but I tend to disbelieve to the reality of
presumed failure 2 (that seems aimed at defending the combat reputation
of the plane) and reported failure 3 (that seems aimed at defending the
combat reputation of the Kommodore, even more than
plane’s reputation).
The battle ends
After Reschke and NN arrival near Short, the dogfight ended.
Short headed
for home and so did the three Ta152s.
The first
Tempest pair, Brooker and Shaw, has likely already headed for homebase, too. It seems that Brooker never entered into any
fight and that neither him nor Shaw (after having downed Sattler) went in help
of Short and Mitchell.
I think it’s
probable that, in dusk scarce light, Brooker and Shaw didn’t even saw the remaining
three Ta152, that at the time of Sattler’s shooting down were circling at very
low level.
Moreover it’s
likely that the first pair was low on ammo (if not out of ammo), probably they
used a lot when strafing ground targets before the aerial combat, and they
could be low on fuel too (they had tanks but dropped them to face the enemies).
On the
contrary, the Ta152s has just been refuelled and were fully armed.
It seems that
Short’s Tempest didn't have any problem in disengaging, in spite of the much
vaunted (by the German) "superior performance" of their fighter (and
take note that according to Cescotti the final phase
of Short’s dogfight happened a 4000m, an altitude which is at the upper limit
of Tempest's "good zone") ...
AN
APPROXIMATE VISUAL DEPICTION OF MY HYPOTHESIS.
I’ve done an approximate
visual depiction of my hypothesis.
Please take note that plane positions, just like some
aspects of pilots’ behaviour, are just presumed, so it’s likely they should be
(more or less) adjusted if and when we have detailed info on battle and crashes
locations.
For example, in the first pictures Brooker and Shaw
are depicted strafing to S-E, then returning to N-W, then heading S-E again:
since there is no info they did exactly that, I could have depicted them as
well as making one-pass strafing run starting from Karstadt
and heading for Ludwigslust.
On the contrary, several other positions and
behaviours are a little bit safer guesses, because are based on details
reported on accounts.
CONCLUSIONS.
In my opinion RAF version, as reported in 2nd TAF's
book, is the correct one, or at least the more reliable.
Not only because it is (understandably) in good
agreement with RAF pilots personal reports, but also because is in good
agreement with German reports when you "purify" them from
inconsistencies they have between themselves (!).
In fact:
1) RAF version relies on pilot reports written
short after the fight, whereas the German side reports seems to be just stories
collected dozens of years later.
Note that, according to J-Y Lorant
researches, Reschke's tales seems to be
quite unreliable "in particular about some victories obtained at the
controls of the revolutionary late war Ta 152". Reschke
here is wrong about the total number of Tempests and is not really credible
when says he was behind Sattler, if we have to trust Cescotti
more than him. Since Reschke has been proved
unreliable in other cases, I trust Cescotti more than
him about details both should know (total number of enemies detected and
Sattler being late at take-off).
Only thing I am a little bit skeptical
about is Cescotti's account of Aufhammer
supercharger failure, made without mentioning any damage on his plane (which
was certainly involved in a long turning battle, so was certainly his plane
that was damaged by Short).
The two things seems to lead to the conclusion that Cescotti tried to find a "justification" for Kommodore's lackluster
performance (even if that could be excusable, for a pilot that was mainly an
"administrator" ...).
Add this to the usual mythicization
of the Ta152 from German side and you'll find many answers ...
2) Reschke's own
account made quite clear that three Ta152 pilots (himself, Aufhammer
and NN) directed their attention just towards the Short-Mitchell pair, ignoring
that there were another pair near them. This seems to be confirmed by the
fact that after Sattler crash all three remaining Ta152 chased Short, whereas
nor Shaw neither Brooker were involved in further fights. Therefore, Reschke and Short reports agree about this
"fixation" of German pilots, so leaving Shaw creditably free,
unnoticed and being able to take Sattler by surprise (just like RAF version
suggests).
Being Sattler late (a creditable detail, when told by
a ground technical member which probably not only witnessed the takeoff but also took part in the solution of the starter
problem!) he probably was in a better (and slightly detached) position to
notice the Brooker-Shaw pair, at least at the last moment. Maybe he did, but
was almost instantly killed by Shaw.
So, joining the more reliable RAF original reports to
the German reports (that also show revealing inconsistencies), we have a good
explanation both about German pilots behaviour (fixation on Short-Mitchell
pair) and the reason of Sattler's crash (Shaw, ignored by all German pilots,
had the opportunity to take him by surprise).
APPARENT
INCONSISTENCIES OF MY EXPLANATION … EXPLAINED!
I know very well that my explanation is in part hypothetical,
but much less than the usual one from German side, that doesnt'
explain at all the "strange" Sattler's crash and has some other
faults (mainly incoherences between Reschke and Cescotti’s accounts
and a very big inconsistency on Cescotti’s report
itself).
Anyway, so far I've found four (apparently serious)
weak points in this explanation.
The first two are in my opinion strictly related. I’ll
point them out here followed by my own justifications that, as you will see,
explains both. Moreover, at the same time it explains a quite huge
inconsistency in German reports!
The explanation for the third and fourth objections
will follow, too.
1) Shaw wrote he saw an E/A "flying at deck
level", whereas Cescotti says that Sattler
"continued to dive and hit the deck out of an altitude of about
2000m".
2) Although Sattler took off a few minutes later than
his teammates, it seems he reached the battle zone just at the same time of the
others (that, according to Reschke, were "immediately
in contact with the enemy fighters"). Remember that the area was just
eight kilometers away from the German airfield, so
"a few minutes" of delay is A LOT of time for such a short flight (at
200 km/h average speed in horizontal flight, it took less than 3 minutes to
cover the distance!)
My explanation for points 1 and 2:
Shaw's report clearly explain that at the moment he
spotted the E/A, he started climbing. It's possible the German saw Shaw and
Brooker, too, because Shaw report that he broke two times. Or, maybe, he really
was Sattler being late, just looking around for enemies and friends. In any
case, is probable that Sattler climbed too, at least a little bit: to face Shaw
or to gain height for a forthcoming battle.
So, how much high was Sattler when he was attacked
by Shaw?
I think we can't reliably use the "Height of
own/enemy A/C on first sighting" on the RAF personal reports, because
these estimates aren't applicable to both Shaw and Short: they were on
different pairs, one diving and the other pulling up, and is highly unlikely
that in both cases they were at 200 ft on first
sighting! Same goes for enemy A/C height estimate which, BTW, is different on
Short's report (100 ft and 3000 ft).
But if we ascribe to Shaw the 300m ("1000 ft") estimate and accept Cescotti's
evaluation of a dive from 2000m (6500 ft) we
have a problem: Sattler should have quickly climbed up for about 1700 mt (5500 ft) before being hitten. Which, at the maximum rate of 3,445 ft/min using MW50 (a boost device that Sattler’s plane
couldn’t have) at low alts (http://www.onwar.com/weapons/aircraft/planes/FockeWulf_Ta152.html
) needs about one minute and a half.
Although Shaw's report isn't explicit about that, it
doesn't seems that so much time passed from the first spotting to the burst.
But ... is Cescotti report
believable on this point ("a dive from 2000m")?
Obviously, Cescotti
very likely bases his account on pilots reports: he didn't took part to
that battle! And it seems quite unlikely he could have clearly eyewitnessed the battle from 8 km, in the dusk, even using
binoculars!
I think the only reasonable explanation is that
Sattler, being late (by a few minutes!), didn't climbed so much after takeoff, in order to reach the battle zone as soon as
possible (he knew that the Tempests have been spotted strafing at very low
level, so he hadn't necessarily to climb a lot).
This way Sattler was able to reach his fellows at the
same time they were on Short and Mitchell, by flying much lower and with a much
greater horizontal speed.
Having probably climbed themselves up to 2000m, the
other pilots (probably unaware of the entity of Sattler's delay) erroneously
thought that he had followed them on an analogous path, so their report on
Sattler's crash involved a "dive from 2000m". Not because they
SAW him diving from 2000m, but because they THOUGHT he did that!
Please note that:
a) for the Germans it was a scramble takeoff against enemies already spotted in action, so
we can be sure the first three Ta152s didn’t wait for Sattler (it would be have
been a case for the court martial if they did!).
b) the Germans, as Reschke
wrote, were “immediately in contact with the enemy fighters”. Reschke’s word apart (that often aren’t reliable at all!),
that is a likely circumstance since the Tempest was spotted on the railway and
in the worst case the Germans had just to reach the railway near Ludwigslust and follow it to find the Allies.
So we can be sure the three Germans didn’t wait for
Sattler for a few minutes circling around near Ludwigslust
when searching for E/As.
Moreover, also Cescotti is
quite clear about that: the three Ta152 “were involved into dogfights just
after take-off”.
In short: the first three Ta152 didn’t wait for
Sattler, nor at takeoff neither before attacking
Short and Mitchell’s Tempests.
Therefore we can sure that Sattler didn’t have any
chance of regaining time lost at takeoff thanks to
his comrades waiting for him: they didn’t (quite understandably).
In conclusion, I think that:
- Sattler never reached 2000m. It's
impossible to do that and make up for all the time lost at takeoff
(a few minutes and not seconds!), being with the teammates just at their
first and immediate contact with the enemy, a circumstance that Reschke reports explicitely and
that would be absolutely inexplicable if you believe at the delay (Cescotti) and at the dive "from 2000m" (surely
not Cescotti's own words, but reported by pilots'
words).
- Sattler flown much lower and faster than the
other Ta152s, likely at an height comparable to Shaw's one. This explains
why Shaw talks about the Hun being "on the deck" and why he managed
to climb above him in an apparently short time.
Again, German reports inconsistencies are revealing!
Besides those apparently weak points, I’ve found
another possible objection.
3) Shaw wrote “An instant later, flames appeared
from the port side &, enveloped in flames, the 190 went down in a gradual
straight dive to the deck" whereas Reschke
didn’t mentioned any flame, talking about Sattler’s fall as it was
“inexplicable”. Moreover, Reschke didn’t saw nor Shaw
neither Brooker.
My explanation for point 3:
The fact that Reschke (and
maybe other pilots) didn't mention flames on Sattler's plane and didn’t noticed
Shaw’s presence doesn't mean much: for sure they were looking at Short and
Mitchell's planes and nothing else. Reschke probably
saw him falling just with the corner of the eye (Sattler was “on our
side”, Reschke says in one of his versions), for
a split second and a certain distance. According to Shaw's report, flame
didn't burst at once and for sure (as I have explained) Sattler was already on
the deck (just like Reschke) when he was hit (and
certainly not at 2000m ...), so it wasn’t a long fall.
According to Shaw, flames initially developed on port
side, then enveloped the plane.
It’s quite possible that Reschke
briefly looked at the undamaged starboard side of Sattler, then diverting
attention to chase Mitchell and only later looking at the crash on the ground,
so losing any chance to see the flames.
Considering the general unreliability of Reschke’s memories, I think we can’t give him full credit
on all details.
Since, after shooting down Sattler, Shaw and Brooker
didn’t took part at any other fight (so they were probably returning home) it’s
no surprise Reschke (who evidently was aware just
of Mitchell and Short) didn’t mention them about the fight.
But Cescotti did, at least
indirectly, saying that after Mitchell’s downing there were two
remaining Tempests (“the remaining two Tempests elected to run away”):
one of them was Short, the other was Shaw!
Then we had to come to what I think is likely the
highest uncertainty in my hypothesis:
4) the unknown relative positions of Short/Mitchell
and Brooker/Shaw pair.
It has a lot to do with the credibility of my
hypothesis, since it relates to the fact the two couple had to to close enough to be involved on the same action, but
spaced out enough to explain why Shaw and Brooker, apart Sattler’s downing,
weren’t further involved and weren’t noticed by Reschke.
One starting point is that Shaw wrote that he was "diving
to attack Met on a road about 10 miles east of Ludwigslust"
when he spotted Sattler.
Did he mean that he was already 10 miles far from Ludwigslust?
If yes, he likely could have been too far from the battle zone, that likely
happened quite close to Ludwigslust (even we don’t
know how much close).
Or did he simply mean, as I think is highly likely, he and Brooker were
starting a strafing dive along a road that runs toward south-east of the city,
maybe up till ten miles?
Remember that according to RAF the mission targets
were the railways and according to Short’s report they were flying and strafing
on “Perleberg-Ludwigslust area” : Perleberg is just 20 miles S-E of Ludwigslust,
beyond Grabow and Karstadt,
so it could be that Shaw’s account of “about 10 miles east of Ludwigslust” just means an approximate position “between
Perleberg and Ludwigslust”.
Quite likely, Shaw didn’t checked his exact position
all the time during the strafing flight, after all he had just to follow a
railway and/or a road!
And in my opinion it’s quite understandable that,
having not recorded the exact position, he reported just an approximate one, on
the basis of the strafing area he was assigned to.
So when he spotted Sattler he likely just knew he was
between the two terminal points of the area and so reported that approximate
position in his report.
My guess is that they were passing east of Ludwigslust
ahead of the other couple (Short and Mitchell were probably going south too,
after having strafed the railway north of the city; in fact the Germans, coming
from Neustadt-Glewe at N-W, attacked them from their
left and rear side), heading S-E in search of ground targets, likely on the road
that at present (and I think probably in 1945 too) runs south-east alongside
the railway from Ludwigslust to Grabow
up to Karstadt.
If Brooker and Shaw would have been already positioned
on an outmost point at ten miles S-E, the two couples could have been separated
by about that large distance, but if Brooker and Shaw were just beginning the
dive to fly over the road at low level (as it seems from Shaw’s report) and/or
Short and Mitchell were already south of Ludwigslust
following the other couple, things could be very different.
In the latter case Brooker and Shaw (notably Shaw) could have been much nearer
to the other couple, maybe just by a few miles (remember that at 450 km/h even
5 or 6 miles could be covered in a little more than 1 minute).
In this case is more likely that Shaw, while looking around to cover his No.1,
could have spotted Sattler N-E of his position.
Another alternative is that Brooker and Shaw
were on a strafing course heading N-W (maybe a second ride, after a first run
heading S-E), some minutes before encountering Sattler, starting about ten
miles far from Ludwigslust along that Karstadt/Grabow road or railway
and so approaching Ludwigslust and the battle area.
There is another detail that lead me to think that
Brooker and Shaw weren’t far from Ludwigslust than
more than four or five miles: Shaw wrote they were attacking Met
(mechanized enemy transports) “on a road”. If the mission targets
were mainly the railways, I suppose they followed the railways from Ludwigslust to Perleberg (or vice
versa) and they likely flown above (and strafed) roads just where railways and
roads were running close each others.
Well, if I suppose roads and railways were in 1945
placed just like they are now, one can see on a map that between Ludwigslust and Perleberg there
is just one road stretch that runs S-E alongside the railway: it’s between Grabow and Ludwigslust and it
runs no more than four miles far from the latter!
South of Grabow, which is at
about four miles S-E of Ludwigslust, the road no more
runs alongside the railway and stays far away and not alongside the railway up
till and much beyond Perleberg.
So, I’m quite confident that Shaw was flying (“on a
road”) between Grabow and Ludwigslust
when at first he spotted the E/A, no farther than four miles from Ludwigslust and the battle area: a distance that seems
easily compatible with all the details of my hypothesis.
And there is one more detail that advises us
not to consider the position reported by Shaw as more than just a really
rough approximation, both in direction and, even more, on distance: “ten
miles east of Ludwigslust” there are some roads
but no railroads and, anyway, that position would be very far from the Perleberg-Ludwigslust area related to the railway-strafing
mission of the four Tempests. And remember: Cescotti
says the scramble was called against four Tempests and if Brooker and Shaw were
10 miles east of Ludwigslust they would have been in
the opposite position relative to Neustadt-Glewe
airfield, whereas all the Ta152s headed towards Ludwigslust!
This means a scenery where Brooker and Shaw Tempests were a few miles
south-east of Ludwigslust (no farther than Grabow), whereas Sattler was coming from north-east and,
trying to join his comrades, was directing towards the other pair (Short and
Mitchell) which was probably at a slightly northern position.
The behavior of Sattler’s presumed plane, as
later described by Shaw, reinforces my hypothesis: in fact Shaw's report
suggests that the German pilot was turning alternatively to W and to E, just
like he was trying to spot where his comrades were.
There is another, very important point, that
lead me to believe that Shaw (and, on the contrary, not Brooker) actually
took part to the dogfight:
- first, the fact that Cescotti
talks about four Tempest as the target for the scramble action. And, in
fact, a flight of four Tempest was strafing the Ludwigslust
area.
- second, the very revealing detail cited by Cescotti about the end of the fight (likely based on
pilot’s accounts, less likely on direct evidence), i.e. that after Mitchell was
shot down “the remaining two Tempests elected to run away”.
If just Mitchell and Short would have been involved,
this phrase wouldn’t have any sense, because at that time just Short would have
been on the battle area!
So, there was one more Tempest there: it was
Shaw!
And we also have a further confirmation that of the
four Tempest spotted strafing their targets, just three (not two and not four)
took part to the fight.
So, Cescotti’s
detail about the “two remaining Tempests” is in perfect agreement with my
hypothesis and with the scenery I depicted!
But all this is, of course, highly speculative.
So, knowing the exact position of the crashes would be of great importance.
Also considering that some uncertainties remains, I
think that my hypothesis is much more credible than the unexplained failure
hypothesis for Sattler’s crash.
SO,
AT THE END WE HAVE:
- on one side an “unexplicable”
crash of a Ta152H and an unexplicable
flight path of that same Ta152H
and
- on the other side a FW190-like plane surely
downed by Shaw, in the same area and at the same time where his teammates
were fighting against Ta152Hs and where Sattler’s Ta152H crashed
I think it quite easy to draw the conclusion that is
very, very likely that Shaw downed Sattler’s Ta152H.
Of course, also considering some uncertainties about
distances and relative positions, there is no absolute confidence that things
went exactly like I described.
But I think that the scenario I described accounts
well for all the relevant details of the episode:
- the
“mysterious” Sattler’s crash
- Sattler’s
otherwise inexplicable flight path (considering his delay at takeoff)
- Cescotti’s report
detail about the number of German planes involved (four Ta152s, in
agreement with Short’s report, since after Sattler’s downing he was chased
by two while he was turning with a third)
- Cescotti’s report
detail about the number of Allies planes involved (four Tempests
intercepted, three of which took part to the dogfight, two of them
remaining after Mitchell’s downing)
None of these details is explained by the usually
reported Reschke’s version of the dogfight and Cescotti’s account can’t explain point 2.
In my opinion, only the evidence of another FW190
downed on April 14, 1945 in the same or very near area and the same time
(distinct by the one downed by Sheddan) could lead at
the conclusion that Shaw didn’t took part at the battle and downed another
plane instead of Sattler’s Ta152H.
Does such a plane exists?
After several years from the first publication of this examination from mine,
it seems that according to someone on the net the answer is “yes”.
And I have no problem in facing with his alternative hypothesis.
But, as you will see, in my opinion he is quite likely
wrong.
THE SKUPINA
HYPOTHESIS.
In 2016, on a net forum appeared an hypothesis, made
by a single forum participant, stating that Shaw really shot down a FW190 flown by Kurt Georg Skupina.
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=43457
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=48464
The proponent, Reiner, wrote:
“I don’t
believe that Shaw shot down Sattler. The Combat report from Shaw states that he
shot down a Fw190 with east course. I think, it was the Fw190 of Skupina, which crashed near Garlin.
Eyewitnesses from Garlin saw a lone Fw190 with east
course and two "American" fighterplanes. If
Shaw know his position not exactly so he could mistook Grabow
with Ludwigslust. 10km SE of the town what he means
as Ludwigslust there is Garlin.
For me W/O never shot down Ofw.Sattler and his Ta152”.
It’s a simple (too much simple …) hypothesis that, at
first, could seduce just for its simplicity but that soon, after an
examination, reveals its many
shortcomings and missing and conflicting details.
I began examining that hypothesis thinking it was promising but more I analysed
it and more it started to show its essence as an unlikely guesswork.
For Skupina’s shooting down
we have much less details than for the battle between Tempests and Ta152s.
It is said that:
· The
pilot was born in Gliwice on March 24,1920.
· He
has been shot down and killed about 500m near Garlin,
a village half way between Ludwigslust and Perleberg. Garlin is located
about 20 km SE of Ludwigslust.
· The
proponent says he found a part of Skupina’s plane (a
sort of rod) and affirms it’s from a Fw190 (for the rest of this examination
I’ll assume that statement is correct, although this should be
independently checked).
· Skupina was very
likely killed on April 14, 1945, as carved on his gravestone on Garlin’s cemetery, so the day is the right one. In
theory that could be just the burial date, if the crash passed unnoticed at
first and the body was recovered some days after but … how could a similar
crash pass unnoticed? In fact, it seems we have witnesses of his shot down. So,
I think that it’s the death date with a 99% chance.
· It’s
not said by the proponent at what time he was shot down (and this is a
huge blank in this hypothesis).
· Witnesses
are reported to say he was shot down by “two
American fighters” while he was flying alone toward East. So, it seems we
have witnesses who remember the event but we still have no info on time, not
even approximate. Quite strange, especially if the event happened at the
unusual time of Ludwigslust event (at dusk), which
for sure should make memories much easier.
· His
unity is unknown, it is said that in WASt (German
casualties archive) his rank is “Gefreiter" (a low-level rank) and his last named unit
is recorded as "3. / Fluganwärter Btl. Flg.Ausb.Rgt.32".
If he was born on the reported date, he was 25 years old (two years older than Reschke, BTW) so he shouldn’t have been a beginner, but the
fact he still had a low level rank suggests that he was no more than an
average-skilled pilot, maybe less than average.
No further details have been given so far.
According to the proponent, Shaw could have mistaken
the small town of Grabow for Ludwigslust, so in his report he wrongly talked about Ludwigslust whereas he shot down a plane around 10 km SE of
Grabow. The fact Shaw wrote that his shot-down FW190
was “flying toward East” seems (just if examined in a superficial way)
to reinforce his hypothesis.
How likely is
this hypothesis right?
Not much, in my opinion.
Let’s examine
the “Skupina hypothesis” in detail.
1) First, Shaw didn't simply reported that the Fw190 was
“flying towards East”, he reported (in a
quite detailed way) that the E/A repeatedly broke (i.e. turned) from East to
West and vice versa (even before the fatal approach of the Tempest).
From Shaw’s report:
"I saw a single Fw.190 flying east
at deck level ... The 190 broke ...
the E/A straightened out east ...
the 190 broke rather later & again to port ... It was a full deflection shot & I opened fire ... I
fired a long burst ... flames appeared from the port side".
Let’s play the following way.
According to Shaw, it seems the behaviour of the FW plane have been:
flying East --- >
now break, so
< --- flying
West
now straightening East
--- >
break again to port, so
< --- flying
West
now being hit and shot down.
If we have to trust the quite precise and detailed
report made by Shaw, it means that the FW was hit on the port (i.e. left) side
while he was flying toward West (after some previous breaks), by
Shaw positioned South respect to the German and attacking while flying towards
NW (to fire his deflection shot).
The fact it has been hit on the port side while flying
West means that Shaw was at South of him and this is easily compatible with the
previous Short-Mitchell and Brooker-Shaw split and a battle near the same Ludwigslust area that saw Sattler’s shot-down, just as in
my hypothetical depiction.
Of course, we can’t be sure of the number of breaks and therefore the final
course of FW (E? W?), just a mistake in Shaw’s report would overturn the result,
that is why I talked about “playing” with these words.
But there is a behaviour that, on the contrary, is clearly shown by
Shaw’s report: it wasn’t a plane constantly “flying towards East”, it was a plane
hovering at deck on the same zone, repeatedly turning.
So we haven't a FW shot down while "flying
with East course" (as the proponent wrote) but a repeatedly turning FW (that, at the end, was likely shot
down while flying towards West).
2) The repeated
breaking is really consistent with an
unaware pilot (Sattler) trying to catch sight of his comrades and enemies he
knew were already engaged into a near battle.
Had Skupina, a low-level
pilot flying alone, quite so good reasons to break again and again in a
dangerous zone, at dusk, instead of running straight toward East (as witnesses
said), likely to land at his airfield at the end of the day?
Even supposing the time of his death was the right one (early
evening), which was his mission? Was he simply returning to his base? If so,
why he didn’t go on straight to East? Was he there just by chance? Was he
trying to engage fight with Allies planes? Alone? Did German base addressed him
toward that zone? Did he heard an help call on the radio by the Ta152s? Did he
spontaneously look for the battle, flying alone?
For the Neustadt-Glewe Ta152s we have a clear
mission, a scramble intercept mission with a team of four fully refuelled and
rearmed planes. For a low-rank pilot, trying to join an unplanned battle at
dusk, flying alone, seems would have been more a suicide than a brave
decision.
Things were fully different for Sattler,
an elite unit pilot who knew there are already three combat-ready
comrades in the area.
Try to imagine: you are Skupina, a lonely and not
too much skilled pilot, in a very dangerous area usually full of
enemies, it’s the end of the day (just a few dozen minutes of daylight
left) and you, instead of returning to your base as fast as possible, stay
at deck on the area, repeatedly turning … to look for enemies?
If not, to look for … what?
No, it’s fully unlikely the pilot Shaw saw and shot down could be Skupina, the behaviour of that pilot speaks against that
hypothesis.
On the other end, it’s quite plausible that Skupina
was killed while (at unknown time) he was flying towards East, maybe trying to
return to his base.
But this is not the behaviour observed by Shaw (and his report is quite
detailed).
And, please, remember that we have NO
clue from German accounts that any other German fighter ever took part to that
battle or was directed to do that, apart the four Ta152s.
I’m not saying it’s not possible.
I’m saying that one thing is having, for the same event, an officially recorded
Allied mission on one side and several accounts on the other side (if not
entirely coherent between them), a very different thing is guessing that one
more lonely pilot, belonging to another unit, could have voluntarily (i.e. suicidally) or accidentally entered into that
late-in-the-day battle which, BTW, for sure didn’t lasted more than 10-15
minutes.
It’s the difference between examining data/reports and making guesses since the
beginning.
No motive, unlikely behaviour, no info about Skupina possibly being there: add all that and, in my
opinion, the easy conclusion is that the shot-down pilot wasn’t Skupina.
3) Quite
important, if not decisive: my hyphotesis is in full agreement with Cescotti’s
account about two Tempests still flying on the same area at the end of Ludwigslust air combat between the Short/Mitchell couple
and the Ta152s.
Likely Cescotti heard this detail from his comrades
after the battle and is significant that he reports “two” remaining Tempest
after Mitchell’s shot-down and not “three”, notwithstanding that his accounts
talks about “four Tempest” involved and Reschke tale
talks about “two Tempest” strafing railways.
As I wrote before, it’s quite evident that Reschke
had a very partial view of the whole battle (just where he was directly
involved) whereas Cescotti had a much more complete
one, in part from his comrades’ accounts, so he has indirectly reported the
arrival on the scene of an additional Tempest.
And, as I wrote before, after Mitchell’s shot-down just the presence in that
area of a Tempest different from
Short’s one could justify such a report.
There were just two other Tempests pilots that could have been present: Shaw and Brooker.
According to Shaw’s report, Brooker wasn’t involved in any air combat
and just Shaw himself managed to close the distance gap and open fire (“I
could see that my No.1 would be unable to attack I dropped my tanks
& climbed for height. As the E/A straightened out east I dived on it passing
my No. 1”).
So, the second remaining Tempest
that were detected by German pilots can be reasonably no other plane than Shaw’s one.
It’s very likely that Brooker, who has remained distant from the zone of the
aerial battles, headed for home just after the successful kill by Shaw, never
approached the Ta152s and was never detected by them.
So at the end the German-side accounts talk about three Tempest (Mitchell,
Short and Shaw) on the four planes that, according to Cescotti,
were chased by the Ta152s: all things hold together.
But even if they had detected Brooker and not Shaw, that would mean the couple
Brooker/Shaw was quite NEAR
at least to one of the three German Ta152 pilots (was the NN pilot to notice
the additional Tempest? was Aufhammer to do that?),
in full agreement with my
hypothesis.
Now, let’s examine the “Skupina hypothesis”, which says that Shaw
shoot-down a FW190 quite FAR
from the area where Short and Mitchell were battling against the Ta152s, in an unrelated action: so the “Skupina
hypothesis” MISSES ONE TEMPEST on the Ludwigslust
fight scene!
And this is a really big fault (even
if not the only one) of that hypothesis.
In no reasonable way Shaw and/or Brooker
could have been detected on the fight scene if they shot-down of a (fully
unrelated) FW190 FAR from that zone.
And it’s not reasonable to think that Skupina was
involved into the battle between Short/Mitchell and the Ta152s, since no report or account or tale,
neither German nor Allied, even
mention another German plane involved.
All the reliable accounts show there were four
Tempests involved in the same action near Ludwigslust
(separated at the beginning into two pairs, Short/Mitchell and Brooker/Shaw)
and four Ta152, which had taken off
from Neustadt-Glewe airfield, engaging two of them
(Short/Mitchell), shooting down one (Mitchell) and being then catched-up by another returning Tempest (Shaw) which very
likely shot-down one of them (Sattler) before the evening battle finished.
“Skupina hypothesis” should explain why another
mysterious FW190, flown by a low-level pilot with no relationship with the
elite Ta152 pilots from Neustadt-Glewe, should have
been involved in the same battle without being reported by Germans and why he
was shot-down in a zone far from Ludwigslust, so
likely far from the Short/Mitchell couple and the Ta152s.
Proponents of “Skupina hypothesis” would have a
really big trouble in trying to explain how a Tempest killing Skupina in an unrelated far-located action could
have been detected near Short/Mitchell/Ta152s fight.
In fact, in my opinion they can’t.
4) Another puzzling detail, if we still would try to believe
to “Skupina hypothesis”, is that Garlin
is about 20 km far from Ludwigslust.
20 km, especially into that war scene, are a
not-so-negligible distance even for planes, for example is the double distance
from Neustadt-Glewe to Ludwigslust.
And is half of the distance from Ludwigslust
to Perleberg, which is the area covered by the Armed
Recce of the four 486 Squadron Tempests.
I know that even my hypothesis suffers from uncertainty about the spatial
location, as I wrote here. But, as I wrote, there could be a likely “dynamic”
explanation to reconcile Shaw’s report with a shot-down happened a few miles
far from Ludwigslust, i.e. in the area between Ludwigslust and Grabow.
And in my hypothesis there is no need of
speculating a mistake by Shaw in towns’ recognitions.
On the contrary, the “Skupina hypothesis” asks us to
believe to a shot-down happened really far from Ludwigslust
and with Shaw mistaking places.
Could it be that Shaw mistook Grabow for Ludwigslust,
so erroneously shifting the reported location 10 km to N? Of course it could
be, but IMHO it's more likely that he
didn't.
Anyone should have well in mind that it was an armed recce between Ludwigslust and Perleberg, so
it’s likely the Allied pilots had previously
examined maps of the area to be able to recognize the two town marking the ends of the planned
course, which are (and were) the largest
ones.
5) As I wrote before, if Shaw and Brooker were
systematically strafing MET along the railway from Ludwigslust
to Perleberg and Shaw wrote about attacking a road,
the only zone where railway and roads
run close together is near Ludwigslust (in practice, just no more than 7-8 km
going from Ludwigslust to Grabow)
.
On the contrary, the railway runs about 7 km far from Garlin,
at East, too much to have road and railway being close one each other.
Of course there are many uncertainties here about the detailed goals and the
development of the Allied recce, but this it’s another detail against the Skupina hypothesis.
6) To accept the Skupina
hypothesis we would also think that witnesses didn't recognize British insigna and mistook
Tempests for "American planes".
Again, it could be possible but Tempests are so
different from P-47 or P-51, for colour (camouflaged vs usually silver) even
more than for shape and insigna, that German citizen used
to look every day at enemy aircraft on their heads, at low heigths,
should had little difficulty to recognize correctly. I’m not forgetting that Ludwigslust fight happened at dusk, so making much more difficult
to detect colours, but at least insigna and silver or
painted surface of planes flying at very low heights should be recognizable.
Obviously, it could be that "American" here just generically means "enemy Allied planes" but this
should be verified.
Another thing worthwhile of an in-depth examination would be if there were
USAAF planes in that area, that day, and if USAAF archives report a compatible
shot-down.
7) At present we have no indication about the time
Skupina was shot-down. We have a quite accurate time
for Ludwigslust’s fight (about 19.30), i.e. at dusk.
If Skupina would have been killed at any time before that (i.e.
during the day) the whole hypothesis would immediately collapse.
As usual in these cases, uncertainties in positions,
time and circumstances hamper any attempt to depict an entirely clear
picture.
It’s not just a problem about “Skupina hypothesis”,
even my hypothesis suffers from the same uncertainty.
And, yes, it’s a good thing to propose hypothesis even if not all the puzzle
pieces fit perfectly together. At least, it forces people to think about the
issue and try to view it under any angle.
But in this case we should have to
accept too many hypothetical, missing and conflicting details if we want to
accept the whole hypothesis.
We would have to suppose the time of the shot-down is the right one (at
present, we haven’t given any info on that), that witnesses mistook the
nationality of Allies planes, that they didn’t saw Skupina
repeatedly turning from E to W, that they reported a shot-down likely happened
in the opposite flight course (towards E instead of W), that Shaw mistook
Grabow for Ludwigslust and
that a second Tempest “mysteriously” appeared at the Ludwigslust
battle zone just after the Mitchell and Sattler crashes!
We would also have to make guesses about the unusual behaviour of the Skupina’s Focke-Wulf, flying
alone on deck while repeatedly turning from E to W and vice versa (a behaviour
well-explained, on the contrary, by my hypothesis regarding Sattler).
BTW, the Skupina hypothesis doesn’t even explains any
inconsistency in the Ludwigslust incident, such as
Sattler’s course, on the contrary to my reconstruction.
- Wrong area
- Unknown time
- Unknown
mission
- Just bare
minimum data about the pilot himself and his unit
- Discordance
with reported plane behaviour
- Discordance
with witnesses’ statements
- No
explanation about the second remaining Tempest in the battle zone where
Mitchell and Sattler crashed
- No added
explanation or clarification about the Ludwigslust
event
Why should we
think that Skupina’s shot-down could be related with Ludwigslust’s fight?
Just because it was a FW190, like dozens of other similar planes flying and
fighting in that area, like the one shot down by Sheddan
the afternoon of the same day?
I wrote here that a compatible shot-down in the same area, same day and
same time, could be a good candidate for an alternative explanation, and I confirm
that, but this hypothesis is lacking under too many aspects to be easily
believed.
First thing to do should be proving that Skupina’s
shot-down happened at the right time (very late afternoon/early evening), after
that the remaining shortcomings could be further discussed.
Until then it’s just a feeble hypothesis not worthy of more examination, maybe
just a little bit better than the unlikely hypothesis many had proposed to
stubbornly deny that Sattler could have been killed by Shaw.
All in all, I think
that at the moment the "Skupina hypothesis"
could have no more than 20% chance to be right (and I think I am
quite benevolent).
However more investigations would be worthwhile, to
learn if its many shortcomings could be fixed.
In the end, I
can say that so far I didn’t found any
convincing evidence of another shot-down that could be an alternative
explanation of the Shaw-Sattler hypothesis.
OBJECTIONS AND
CRITICISMS OF MY RECONSTRUCTION:
During last years my
reconstruction has been subject, on air enthusiasts forums, to several
objections and criticisms (even if to many of these objections I’ve
pre-emptively answered by myself and published the answer here since the first
version of this page).
This wasn’t unexpected at all, though.
I know very well how good is Ta152 reputation amongst
many enthusiasts and I foresaw a certain kind of reaction since the very first
day.
Defending one’s favourite aircraft is a thing that any
fan (me included) does, to a lesser or greater extent. This behaviour is even
more understandable about a very hyped plane such as Ta152, especially because
such an hype can rely just on a fistful of events, so bursting the bubble about
Ludwigslust just cuts by half the basis for so much
praising.
I’ll try to recapitulate here the relevant objections
I’ve received (leaving out some of the silliest or funniest, to which I’ve
already answered on forums).
o
“If Shaw had
really shoot down Sattler, he would have recognized that it wasn’t a FW190 but
a MUCH different plane, easily recognizable as different from its longer wings.
So him or RAF gun camera examiners would have left some trace of the discovery,
on the combat report or on other documents.”
I’ve already
answered to this since the first version of this page, I’ll expand it here.
My point is
that a Ta152-H WASN’T “easily
recognizable as different from a FW” AT ALL during a short and fierce fight.
Neither it was on gun camera, if the camera angle had a view mainly from the
side (as it certainly was in this case).
There is no way to easily distinguish a Ta152-H from a long-nosed FW190
if you see it mainly from the side, especially during a short adrenalinic high-speed fight. It's not just like looking at
a picture, being comfortably seated on a chair!
FW190
D-9 
Ta152-H
It was a extremely short
encounter between Shaw and Sattler on the deck, so a brief horizontal and
not a long vertical battle, where it seems Shaw hit the EA fuselage from the
side ("just forward of the cockpit"). In the first part of the
encounter Shaw was, according to his report, too far away from Sattler to easily distinguish the wings’ shape
and length, then when he was closer he saw the German plane mainly from the side (he fired a deflection
shot). So it's very likely that Shaw couldn't notice the prolonged wings
because when he was close to Sattler he saw his wings mainly at a quite narrow
angle.
Moreover, Shaw
didn't knew of the existence of that new type of Focke-Wulf,
so the recognition as a Focke-Wulf was a very good
identification indeed.
Having Shaw
recognized it as a FW190, even gun
camera examiners (equally unaware of Ta152 existence) had no reason to linger
over these images, showing a Focke-Wulf being hit by
side, other than to confirm the victory.
You can
understand how easy can be to mistook a plane for another kind, during a
battle, thinking at Short mistaking Ta152 for BF109s, in the same battle!
There are also
tales of Allied pilots briefly shooting at Typhoons and Tempests because their
(very different, in reality!) hefty noses reminded to them those of FW190-A.
And, if you
can believe it, in one occasion Ta152s were mistook for USAAF fighters by
German pilots! (see my note on 2-3-1945, in kill/loss score section).
I think that
at least anyone believing to this last “strange tale” (one of the many about
Ta152 …) should have the decency not to
express any objection about Shaw’s “wrong” identification (which, on the
contrary, was a quite good one).
o
“Your
reconstruction is based on Cescotti’s statement that
Sattler was delayed at take-off. But Cescotti was
wrong on the number of Ta152 that attacked Tempests! All reports talk about
just three German pilots, a Kette in Luftwaffe
nomenclature, also giving their individual names. Even Cescotti
talks about a Kette, which according to Luftwaffe
doctrine is a three-plane formation! And even if Cescotti
really meant FOUR planes, if he really remembered of four planes, he very well
might have simply confused another aircraft taking off for a completely
unrelated reason that had nothing to do with intercepting Tempest on that day!
This would be a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy, a reasonable
explanation that you are neglecting!”
I see
disconcerting issues in many objections like this, which had stubbornly
repeated to me notwithstanding my detailed and immediate counter objections.
They really show the desperation of some Ta152 fans realizing that their bubble
is bursting, that someone is showing them that Santa Claus doesn’t exist.
Just to face
immediately the more embarrassing issue, before passing to less crazy
hypothesis, let's just say that the last "reasonable explanation" can
be defined at best with one word: "laughable". Let's imagine
Ta152s at Ludwigslust on the afternoon of 14 April
1945, having looked for a battle all the day with Russian fighters without
being able to see any EA, refuelled, taxied and camouflaged, with pilots
waiting for some action. Now, suddenly, they have to face not just one but TWO
missions needed to be executed essentially at the same time (!), so that Cescotti got confused: an urgent scramble towards Ludwigslust against Tempest and another equally
important and urgent mission, so important and urgent to divert at least
one precious Ta152 from the defense of Ludwigslust railways. A quite curious circumstance, two
urgent mission occurring at the same time, that has never recorded by
ANY tale from German side! This curious coincidence is just an example of the pure
madness reached by some Ta152 fans, inventing whole hypothetical events
and circumstances just to avoid to admit their beliefs are not sustainable
when confronted with reports and testimonies, pushing beyond the limit their
sense of the ridiculous. Unluckily, it's not the only example.
Now let's
forget that insane and funny hypothesis and say that Cescotti
is extremely clear on the number of
Ta152s that scrambled towards Ludwigslust: a Kette (three planes) PLUS
a fourth single plane (Sattler's one). In total, FOUR planes.
So it's really
silly to go on mentioning the word
"Kette" as a relevant detail. Also because
surely Cescotti know what a Kette
is, so if he talk about a Kette plus another plane he is talking about four planes.
In fact, Cescotti explicitly says "The fourth Ta 152 ... took off a few minutes after the leading Kette".
Short's
official report tells about three Ta152 remaining after Sattler's crash,
fighting directly with him, so reinforcing Cescotti's
credibility and further weakening Reschke's one.
o
“Why
Cescotti doesn't name the fourth pilot? It’s quite
suspicious!”
I dont' know why he doesn’t name him, I just collected all
the names I knew of possible Ta152 pilots in the hope that someone could make a
good guess.
My guess is
that Cescotti didn't remember his name and didn't want
to hazard a name.
But the fact that he talks about four pilots even if he names just three of
them is in my view a clue that he REALLY
remembered four planes and wanted to be accurate at least on that point. In
fact, it would have been simpler for him to talk about three planes, leaving
out from his tale the fourth unnamed pilot, whose attendance wasn't relevant.
Indeed, the unnamed pilot was the only German pilot not really involved into the
fight, neither as a "killer" nor as a "victim", so if there
has to be a forgotten name it's understandable it was his name.
o
“You
accuse Rescke for writing he flown behind Sattler
during the flight but on his official account, on his book, he just said to
have flown in a three plane formation, i.e.a Kette. Nowhere does Reschke state
he was in formation with Sattler!”
Apart the fact
that there is no "official account" from German side, as I'll explain
later, Reschke's position relative to Sattler during
flight to Ludwigslust (ahead, behind, at the side …)
is not important in my
reconstruction, it could be relevant just for Reschke's
credibility, which in my opinion is already undermined by other details.
The
fundamental point is to believe or not to believe in Cescotti.
If we believe
in him, about an event he witnessed (a significant delay), Sattler couldn't have flown in formation with Reschke.
So much for that.
o
“Nobody
timed Sattler's delay, so the "few minutes" mentioned by Cescotti could have been just a few seconds!”
To say (as it
has been done) that "in the excitement of a scramble, it is human nature for time to
become diluted. A few minutes may actually be only a few seconds" just
demonstrates, in addition to a fan's desperate attempt to support his shaky
belief, that the battle scenario hasn't been examined at all.
In fact area
battle at Ludwigslust is so close to Neustadt-Glewe that the entire flight between these points
required just a few minutes, so even
a thirty or fourty seconds delay would have been
extremely significant and requiring a very different flight path by
Sattler, to regain time lost at take off.
I can easily
believe that "time could have become diluted" in Cescotti's
mind but not so much to hide the difference from three Ta152s taking off and a
fourth significantly delayed, to the point that Cescotti
say that just "three of those Tas were involved into dogfights just after take-off"
whereas "[the fourth] took off a few
minutes after the leading Kette".
If there were
just "a few seconds delay", Cescotti
wouldn't have even likely mentioned the fact because he would have witnessed
the four Ta152s taking off just one after (or at the side of) the other, as a
four plane formation.
o
“Why
have we to believe to Cescotti and not to a witness
like Reschke? The most reliable account is the first
person eyewitness, i.e. Reschke himself. He wrote the
only reliable version in his book, all the rest is hearsay! And you have no
other direct testimony other than Resche's one for
the fight! Cescotti witnessed just the take-off
phase. Your hypothesis is based on hearsays and unreliable sources as
Wikipedia!”
There is NO official account from German side, not even by Reschke. There are just some post-war versions from Resche, written many decades after the events and relying just
on memories!
One of those
version is reported in Reschke’s own book.
Another one is
on a book by John Weal, who cites Reschke's own
words, speaking for himself: did Weal invented those words?
The third
version is on Wikipedia (and I've been the first to say it's the less reliable
of the three).
In addition, from German side we have Cescotti's
account, which is to consider when he speaks about
pre-flight, take off and post-flight details he witnessed, absolutely useless
about the details of the fight itself that he DIDN'T witness.
His only other detail really worthwhile of consideration is the number
of remaining Tempests after Mitchell’s shot-down (“two”, according to Cescotti), which is very significant because he wrote that
four Tempest were strafing on Ludwigslust, one was
shot-down and two remained, so indirectly confirming that just three Tempests
(i.e. Mitchell, Short, Shaw) on four were involved into the aerial fight.
He couldn’t have deduced that number, “two”, by subtracting the
destroyed Tempest (Mitchell) from the initial four, in that case he would have
talked about “three” remaining Tempest. The only likely explanation for the
number “two” is that some of the three surviving German pilots noticed just another
near Tempest (Shaw) at battle end, in addition to Short, and accounted
the fact to Cescotti after their return to Neustadt-Glewe. And this allows us to complete the puzzle of what
happened in a quite convincing way, after having explained the reasons for
several inconsistences in reports.
Only official accounts we have are RAF pilots' ones.
My reconstruction isn't based on Wikipedia (if it were,
case would be closed, since that version says that Sattler was hit ...), it's based on RAF pilots' reports and
on facts Cescotti witnessed, taking into account just
those facts about Reschke’s tale that are supported
by other independent and credible testimonies.
In fact, Cescotti testimony of take-off phase is not paltry. On the
contrary, it’s a fact extremely relevant
(albeit incredibly overlooked so far) to draw a credible reconstruction.
So, the
question has to be reversed: why to
believe to Reschke and not to Short and Cescotti, whose fully independent accounts are in perfect agreement about total number of planes involved (not a subtle and ambiguous
detail, just the number of planes)?
Some TA152
fans say "because he was a
witness". Wrong answer, please try again.
Short was a witness too and he should have
remembered quite well (with a shiver down his spine) those TWO EAs attacking
him, so likely at quite close distance, in ADDITION to Aufhammer's
plane he was fighting with! So well to write about that on an official report.
And Cescotti was by far
in the best position of all (much better than Reschke's
one) to witness all the take-off phase at Neustadt-Glewe
and the number of Ta152 thrown into the battle.
Blindly believing to Reschke,
i.e. to a tale assembled many decades after the fact, written by a person whose
unreliability has been already found by historians when examining other
statements by him, and ignoring the
other contrasting direct testimonies and official reports, it’s not a sign of
“researcher’s reliability”.
On the contrary, it’s a sign of naivety or a sign of bad faith.
o
“You
are just trying to do a shameful character assassination of Willi Reschke!”
This seems to
be the last resort of some desperate and uncritical Ta152 fans.
I want to be
clear and honest: I’m not surprised at all that J-Y Lorant
found faults in Reschke’s statements. If even me can
find faults, its’ no surprise that a reputed historian does the same and easily
better! These inconsistencies and fallacies are likely due to bad memories,
fully understandable since Reschke’s age and the fact
he has no written evidence from wartime.
But I also
suspect that Reschke himself could have been “polished” his version over the years,
this could explain why there are three
versions around, generally agreeing between themselves but with differences in
some details.
Is Reschke in good faith? I suppose he is.
At the same
time it seems likely to me that he, just as many others, is trying to carry on
the “Ta152 myth” (into which he is personally involved).
This is the only
respectable hypothesis I can made regarding his statement about Ta152 showing a
better performance than Tempest in
that battle or, in any case, a particularly remarkable performance by
his Ta152-H. He has been a very good pilot and no good pilot in all fairness could draw such a conclusion from a fight
where:
-
he took his victim by surprise
-
he had speed and altitude advantage
-
he was an ace and managed to shoot down an absolute
rookie
-
and all this even without considering one further issue,
that is included in my reconstruction: he was chasing Mitchell together with
one more Ta152 (the NN pilot).
A rookie taken
by surprise by two EAs, one of which was flown by an ace. Plane superiority?
Great performance by Ta152? Which plane superiority? Which great performance?
I want to
speak now basing on the hypothesis of just good faith and bad memories by Reschke.
I think that he, rushing to the battle, probably didn't even realize, at that
time, that Sattler has been delayed and so he could likely have now a bad
memory about the pilot flying ahead of him towards Ludwigslust:
he could well have been the fourth unnamed pilot, instead of Sattler.
After having entered in contact with Tempests, Reschke's
formation broke so his plane identification shuffled and his focus diverted to
Sattler's crash and to EAs.
If Sattler followed a flight path similar to what I suggest, he would have been
arrived at battle area at about the same time of Reschke,
so the latter never had a clue of the initial delay of the comrade!
Emotional event regarding Sattler's crash has been likely much more present in Reschke's mind, for long decades, that any other memory
about a further pilot taking part to the fight (but without showing himself in
any action to remember and this detail could be quite significant).
Reschke's mistakes about Loos victories (as the
researcher J-Y Lorant found) demonstrate that we have
to expect also bad memories from him.
o
“How
can you be so sure about your reconstruction? It’s based just on many unproven
hypothesis!”
I’m not
“sure”, I just tried to assemble a credible reconstruction, since the
“explanation” of Sattler’s crash by German side wasn’t an explanation at all.
Before
beginning this examination I wasn’t sure it was possible, but after having
examined sources I concluded it was possible to draw a coherent reconstruction.
I think that
we can’t be sure (and likely we won’t even in future) that German version is
true or, on the contrary, that Sattler has really been shot down by Shaw.
But the two
German versions are full of contradictions and "mysteries" whereas a quite simple and coherent hypothesis
can be made and leads to think that Sattler fell victim to Shaw.
Shaw's kill
claim is a kill claim with every needed confirmation, including gun camera
movie. In fact, it’s listed amongst confirmed victories.
Only thing
that remains to see is if that Focke-Wulf was really
Sattler's one but so far nobody has been able to reasonably indicate another FW that could have been the
victim.
Critics of my
reconstruction should HONESTLY ask to themselves:
how much great is the chance that the plane shoot down by Shaw was NOT
Sattler?
- Same location,
- same time,
- same Tempest section involved in Ludwigslust
action,
- no other German plane reported by Germans themselves as having being
involved in Ludwigslust fight,
- even good compatibility within reports once inconsistencies and
impossibilities has been explained.
Ockam's
razor, inconsistencies in German versions, already found faults in other Reschke's accounts (such as about Loos victories), lack of
official (and wartime) Luftwaffe reports and, on the contrary, the fact that
Allied pilots gave (on the same day) official reports with significant details,
all this concurs in building such a reconstruction.
One can
stubbornly think that it's "impossible" that Sattler has been shot
down and resort to mere hypothesis (some of them unlikely, some other very
funny) or accept the simplest and more coherent possibility.
I perfectly
know that some people will refuse to see
their bubble bursted, but I made this examination
just for people willing to think.
In some cases
I’ve seen criticisms coming from people that seemed able to think but, frankly
speaking, in other cases I’ve not.
PART TWO: THE
MYTH
SOME
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT PLANE PERFORMANCES … AND MYTHS!
The Ludwigslust episode has
often been used to “prove” the superiority of Ta152H over any other
advanced Allied piston fighter.
And even with very low numbers (planes built,
missions, kills …) to his credit, the Ta152 has ever got exceptionally good
press.
For example, in his book "Focke-Wulf
Ta152" Dietmar Harmann
is adamant in describing that plane as the Eight
Wonder of the World, surely eclipsing ANY other contemporay
piston fighter, just like that statement was supported by hundreds of air
battles instead of just a few and sometimes controversial episodes! ("The
pilots of the Tank also did not have to fear P47 Thunderbolts or Hawker
Tempests, as several victories proves", "Its high
speed, tight turning radius and enormous climb rate must actually have brought many
P-47 and Tempests pilot to the point of desperation").
Just imagine how probable it is, performance and score overstatements apart,
with probably less than 40 Ta152H entered in operation during the war, just a
handful of missions and not more than eight or ten kills!
And, I had to add, not better than a 1-1 score against
Tempests, the downed one being flown by a combat-rookie, chased by two Ta152 at
once and shot down by an ace …
Not to mention opinions widely read on WWII aircraft forums
all over the net, from “the Ta152 is the best WWII piston fighter”
(quite a moot point) to “it has never been shot down” (absolutely
false).
Someone even said that “the Ta-152H was perfectly
carrier capable”!
Funny? Yes.
Or no, because there is nothing to be cheerful indeed,
if you consider how much widespread such quite absurd mythology is.
It seems to me that Kurt Tank himself was
(quite understandably) behind that propaganda, at least in the
beginning.
Let’s recall, for example, his over-famous “easy
escape” from four (or six) Mustangs at 7000m, an achievement which couldn’t have been reached looking at
declared altitude performance of the two planes (Ta152H was clearly faster than
Mustang P51D just above 8000m).
It seems that the fact, if true, has two likely
explanations:
1) the Mustangs simply didn’t spotted him …
- OR -
2) the Ta152 was, as someone guessed, a testbed plane,
with a 2400 hp DB603EC engine and MW 50 injection,
being able to reach 720 km/h at 7000m, and not a production model (http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=5691
).
It’s just like Hawker Tempest performances were judged
using Tempest Mark I prototype and its 750 km/h in horizontal flight …
Judging by the German reports about Ludwigslust fight, it seems that also some German pilots
and grounded crew members talked in a quite hyperbolic and propagandistic way
about the plane!
In fact, I wasn’t surprised at all when I discovered
that Reschke’s assertions have to be taken
at least with a grain of salt (and I want to be euphemistic here …),
because many of them (especially related to Ta152H) seems to have little
to do with reality!
In my opinion, the Ludwigslust
episode doesn’t show any superiority of Ta152H over Tempest V (at
the medium-low heights where the fight took place, obviously):
- the net score is 1-1;
- one could have doubt over Shaw’s victory, but one
could have doubt over Reschke’s victory too, since
probably Mitchell crashed just by his own mistake;
- the gap in
skill and experience between Mitchell and Reschke
was huge and just this factor fully accounts for the outcome;
- moreover, Short and Mitchell was caught by surprise and almost certainly
at disadvantage both in altitude and speed;
- if my reconstruction is correct, the rookie Mitchell
has to face two Ta152s at the same time (Reschke
and NN);
- Aufhammer was hit by Short and very likely just the
arrival of his two comrades saved him
by being shoot down;
- if we had to believe to German reports, the Ta152Hs
had an astonishing number of failures just in one mission (anyway, as I
explained I don’t fully believe that);
- even admitting Aufhammer’s
supercharger failure, the dogfight started at very low level (100 ft) and, according to Short, he was able to hit Aufhammer just after 3 climbing turns, so it’s very
unlikely they had already reached a quite high altitude, starting from the
ground! This means that actually Aufhammer was likely
hit, having a “malfunctioning” supercharger reputedly set at low-alt, when he was suffering no significant loss of power!
- Short’s Tempest, probably low on ammo and surrounded
by three “superior” Ta152s (two of them almost certainly able to shoot), managed to leave the fight without any
problem.
After examining the facts, the only things that
remains about that so much vaunted “superiority”, at Ludwigslust
and elsewhere, are … the German-side
statements on “how good it was”!
Statements “supported” just by a handful of uncertain
scores and controversial episodes and NOT supported by declared and estimated
flight characteristics at medium and low heights, nor by air combat kill/loss
ratio (as we’ll see later).
Quite no reason to believe to Ta152H “superiority” even
at medium and low altitudes!
So, when examining the overly-famous Ludwigslust event we are analyzing
not just a war episode but also and mainly a case of myth building: the myth
of the Focke-Wulf Ta152.
THE
MOST OVER-HYPED AND OVERRATED AIRPLANE EVER.
I’v ever been an estimator of that
fighter, at least as high-altitude interceptor, and since some
times ago I believed that it could be easily considered “the best” WWII
fighter.
But after having examined several reports, books, stories, tales etc., I’m now
convinced that Ta152 is the most over-hyped plane of the WWII (or maybe
of every time …).
Please look:
·
it flew in a tiny number (a few dozens), so tiny that
statements about P47, P51 and Tempest’s pilots “surely scared” by Ta152s are
frankly ridiculous
·
almost half of the known pilots to have flown
it were aces (!)
·
it hadn’t a single reliably recorded victory agains bombers
(see my note about Keil’s first claimed victory),
despite the fact it has been designed as an high-altitude interceptor
·
in spite of having been flown by so many aces, it has
an absolutely unimpressive (yes: UNimpressive
…) kill/loss score. In fact:
Kill / loss score of Ta152 in air combat.
Victories in air combat
(that can be considered sufficiently reliable, at least as much as any other LW
victory claim):
1 P51D, 1-3-45, Josef Keil
[1], Ta152H, Reichsgebiet
1 P47, 10-4-45, Josef Keil,
Ta152H,
1 Tempest, 14-4-45, Willi Reschke,
TA152H, Ludwigslust
1 Yak-9, 21-4-45, Josef Keil,
TA152H,
1 Yak-9, 21-4-45, Josef Keil,
TA152H,
1 Yak-9, 24-4-45, Willi Reschke,
TA152H,
1 Yak-9, 24-4-45, Willi Reschke,
TA152H,
Victories reported by one source, but absolutely unreliable
[2]:
1 Yak-9, 24-4-45, Walter Loos, TA152H,
1 Yak-9, 24-4-45, Walter Loos, TA152H,
1 Yak-9, prob. 30-4-45, Walter Loos, TA152H,
Losses in air combat:
- 11-4-45 Hptm. Hermann
Stahl, KIA [3]
- 14-4-45 Obfw. Sepp
Sattler, KIA by 486sq W/O W.J. Shaw, Tempest SA-J (NV753), Ludwigslust [4]
- one loss at end of 4-45, Unknown JG11 pilot, downed
by a Spitfire during transfer from Neustadt-Glewe to Leck [5]
- one more loss at end of 4-45, Unknown JG11 pilot,
downed by a Spitfire during the same transfer from Neustadt-Glewe
to Leck [6]
[1] some sources (e.g. http://www.luftwaffe.cz/keil.html)
state that Keil has five victories in Ta152H,
including a claim of a B-17 over Berlin on 20-2-1945, whereas
his score with that plane really seems to be four, from 1-3-45 to 21-4-45,
since Ta152H was delivered to JG301 just on 27-2-45 and the first recorded
Ta152 combat action against American bombers happened on March 2, 1945 (Harmann, "Focke-Wulf
Ta152", pages 100-101).
Some people has claimed that since Jagdgruppe
III./JG 301 had Ta152 in service at the
end of January (as a combat test unit) , an individual mission could
well have been flown by Keil.
Frankly, I just can’t believe to an “individual
mission” against American bombers (!), especially with a brand-new and still
largely untested fighter! Not credible at all …
It could well have been possible a mixed sortie
(Ta152s and FW190s), just like March 2, 1945 mission was. But, then, 20-2-1945 mission would be considered the
first Ta152 mission against bombers, not 2-3-1945 one …
But I want to point out two other issues:
- this very dubious Keil
victory it’s just what Is needed to make a “Ta152 ace” (five victories
flying that plane). In fact, that’s how Keil is often
mentioned: “first (and only) Ta152 ace”.
Reaching an “ace” status would have been important for Ta152 reputation too.
- even more important: that would be the ONLY Ta152
high-altitude victory against a bomber. If you consider that Ta152 was
mainly designed to defend Reich’s skies from American bombers, in competiion with innovative planes such as Me262 and He162,
it would have been detrimental to plane reputation NOT to have a single victory
against bombers. Shooting down bombers was the main goal of the new interceptor
and the required achievement to raise Tank’s reputation at Messerschmitt’s
prestige level. Suspiciously, the very first and very dubious victory of Ta152
has been claimed against a bomber! Quite curious, isn’t it?
Even more if you consider that Ta152 never downed
another bomber in the rest of its combat career, not even in 2-3-1945 mission,
when the “official excuse” (another of several “odd” claims by Ta152 praisers) is they were mistakenly attacked by 109s at more
than 8000m, so they lost any chance to fight against escort fighters and
bombers: not a great achievement for the supposed “faster and more powerful high-altitude piston interceptor” …
All in all, this claimed victory fits so well into
“Tank’s Reputation Defending Club” scenario that its even less credible than it
would be from just the suspicious lack of a reliable combat report.
[2] Ta152 victories reported by Reschke
but denied by Loos himself in a 1979 interview and other evidences (personal
diaries and letters of Loos comrades-in-arms). Loos stated that he never shot
down a single enemy fighter while flying the Ta152, see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=22979
. So, if Loos had victories these days, they weren’t achieved while flying a
Ta152 but a different kind of plane.
[3] according to Reschke
testimony, Stahl was killed on 24-4-45 (see Dietmar Harmann’s book "Focke-Wulf
Ta152", page 106); but it seems he really was shot down 11-4-45, flying
with Josef Keil as wingman, see http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=4764&view=findpost&p=23007
)
[4] this loss as a consequence of enemy action is not
definitely confirmed, although highly probable (as I explain in this document)
[5] [6] as reported by Dietmar
Harmann in his "Focke-Wulf
Ta152" book, page 107; although it was a transfer flight between two LW
airfields, these two Ta152s were operative machines already assigned to Stab
JG11 and it seems absolutely unlikely they were unarmed when flying on a combat
area, so these has to be considered air combat losses in all respects (and,
BTW, take note that it seems the two Ta152s were unable to escape even from
"simple" Spitfires ...)
(Data collected comparing several sources, the main
ones being:
- Dietmar Harmann’s book "Focke-Wulf
Ta152”, Shiffer Publishing, 1999
- http://www.luftwaffe.cz
web site
- http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org
web site)
- these are a few of the many Ta152 praising
statements you can found looking around in books and on the net, totally
denied by recorded scores:
- “The
Ta152 had shot down at least 10 enemy aircraft for the loss of just
two of their own number” (Harmann, "Focke-Wulf Ta152", Schiffer Publishing, 1999).
- “With
its scintillating performance, numbers of high performance Allied
fighters fell to its guns in the final weeks of the war. Despite the fact
that the Ta 152 H was intended to combat high-altitude Allied bombers,
very few missions of this type were ultimately ever flown. Despite this no
Ta 152s were lost to enemy fire....” (http://www.ww2f.com/weapons-wwii/12510-flying-152-a.html
)
- “In
the very limited time the Ta-152H saw service it established itself a 11
to 0 kill ratio in the air” (http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bf-109-vs-spitfire-vs-fw-190-vs-p-51-a-13369-6.html
)
- on the contrary, the true kill/loss air combat ratio
of Ta152 seems to be about 2:1 (7 victories, 4 losses; even if
Shaw’s victory wouldn’t be accepted as real, things wouldn’t significatively change). And this for a plane that seems to
have been flown by aces for the half of all the pilots!
Just for comparison and taking the cue from Ludwigslust’s event, their rivals Hawker Tempests (which for sure weren’t flown by aces for the half
of their pilots and, BTW, were mainly employed in ground strafing actions and
not looking for air kills …) have about 8:1 ratio in air combat!
(victories: 239 confirmed, 9 probable; losses: 31 including probable ones; just
to be clear, recorded air victories don’t include here shot-down V-1s
too, all are true air combat kills against German planes, almost all late-war
fighters)
Sources:
Victories: http://www.hawkertempest.se/index.php/piloter/victories
Losses: http://www.acompletewasteofspace.com/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=10501
(taken from “The Typhoon & Tempest Story, Thomas & Shores”; all
kind of losses are reported, I singled out the air combat losses)
For sure we also have statements of Ta152H pilots
highly praising the plane.
But the fact is that nor by Germans’ own
performance evaluations (see table at pg.137 of Harmann’s
book "Focke-Wulf Ta152") neither
by combat scores the Ta152H seems to deserves such a hype.
So I think that there were a sort of informal
“club” around Kurt Tank and his new interceptor, including some pilots, aimed
to high praising the plane (and his designer, of course) well beyond its merits.
Why they did (and some still are doing) that?
Comradeship or maybe true friendship, I think. And
they have gone so far in Ta152 mythicization that
those who are still alive can’t pull out now, just not to damage their
reputation.
Anyway, looking from an objective point of view, we
would be silly to blindly trust all their (often inconsistent) words.
By the way, I’ve found I’m not alone in thinking Ta152
is over-hyped and overrated, look for example at this forum discussion:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/ta152-h1-uber-fighter-555.html
Even this blog, from a Luftwaffe expert and
enthusiast, http://falkeeins.blogspot.com/2010/04/towards-perfection-tank-ta-152-reschke.html
concludes that “combat reports of its
‘superiority’ are questionable at best”.
MYTH
DEBUNKED.
In conclusion, there is absolutely no reliable
support to the claim that Ta152H was the best all-around WWII fighter (and
please forget about the heavy Ta152C version, that on the other hand never took
part in war combats).
On the contrary, its combat score could be opportunely
defined as “almost lackluster”.
Ta152H was certainly a very good plane (designed, by
the way, to be a bomber interceptor much more than a fighter), but it had to
shone at high altitudes (as it was designed to do), not at medium and
low heights, where (just to talk about Focke-Wulfs
only) the excellent and proven Fw190D-9 and the subsequent D-12 and D-13 had
better performances (see Harmann’s book, table at
page 137).
So, what fuelled the myth?
I think that in very dangerous months of Hitler’s
Reich, both Tank and pilots like Aufhammer needed
some propagandistic shield to avoid the risk to fall into disgrace.
Prof. Tank, struggling in eternal
rivalry against Willi Messerschmitt (who had created the revolutionary Me262,
which was already in operation), put his bet on Ta152 and he couldn’t afford
the risk to fail.
So he did his best to create a mythical aura
for his newborn, also involving some of its pilots.
My opinion is that they pushed on too much on this
airplane mythicization, before and after the end of
the war, to allow those that still live to pull out now.
It's all a matter of reputation now, I suppose.
Since Ta152H had so limited use in real action and since Kurt Tank
himself started the myth already at war time with the "Mustang tale"
(likely to justify his "bet" on Ta152 instead on improving the
excellent FW190D), that plane "needed" at least a few bright
victories against strong enemies.
Please note: Ta152H
was designed to be an high-altitude interceptor and “bomber destroyer” but it
didn’t succeeded even in that, as I explained in my previous note about the
unlikely B-17 victory claimed by Josef Keil.
So, after a few months of operations Ta152 reputation
was at risk of sinking: no success against bombers and only a couple of
victories (so far) against fighters, despite the fact it has been assigned to
elite pilots.
The Ludwigslust dogfight was apparently a very good
occasion to praise plane performances against one of the most powerful Allied
fighters.
And admitting, at wartime or even now, that at the end the fight concluded just
with a 1-1 score notwithstanding the German numerical superiority 4-vs-3 (with
the German hit scored by an ace against a rookie and a Kommodore
that really risked to be shoot down!) well ... it wouldn't be good to build the
myth!
On the other hand, it seems that the only plane that
Ta152 fought with some notable success (even less than often erroneously
stated, it had just four victories against it) was the Russian Yak-9.
It could be said that Ta152 was just a “Yak killer” but, again, this wouldn’t
have been glorious enough to state the plane “superiority”.
So, it seems that a large part of Ta152 myth has
been purposely built upon two events, Tank’s “escape” from American Mustangs
and Ludwigslust’s battle against British Tempests.
That likely seemed much better to them, to build
a myth, than vaunting victories against supposedly “rough” Soviet pilots
and planes …
Even these days, the myth is feed by unconvincing
comparisons with P47, P51 and Tempests.
There are some quite “strange” things even about Ta152H performance
evaluations: the Germans didn’t performed any comparative test not only
against a captured Tempest V (that could be understandable: it seems the
captured plane, recovered from an emergency landing, had a lot of engine
problems) but (and that’s not understandable at all!) neither against a Fw190D,
the Ta152 immediate and most performant predecessor!
They just evaluated it against a Fw190A-8!
(see Harmann’s book, pages 93-100).
Could it be that Kurt Tank was trying to justify its
(maybe objectionable) efforts to produce a successor to D-9 instead of further
improving the Dora, so not only he created “the myth” but also purposely tested
the plane just against an older FW190 version?
By the way, the so much boasted “clear superiority” of
Ta152H even against the FW190A-8 and even at low altitudes, especially
about its agility (reported, for example, in Harmann’s
book, pg. 93), seems to be denied by Capt. Eric Brown, who in his book
“Wings of Luftwaffe” accounts of his test flight on a Ta152H-1:
"On the descent from altitude to Brize Norton, I had time to make quick checks on the
stability and control of the German fighter. I found a noticeable reduction in
roll rate and an increase in the force per G by comparison with its
BMW801-powered predecessors, some of the more attractive qualities of the
original fighter having been sacrificed in order to achieve the best possible
performance at extreme altitudes. I therefore expected the stability to be
improved over the Fw190, as indeed it was, but it was not so good that a
protracted flight at 45000ft (13715m) would not have
been a fatiguing experience, a fact evidently recognised by the provision of an
autopilot." (http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=1492
)
It just seems to me another clear clue that Tank’s
entourage, likely including some “friend” pilots, tried to depict the plane as
much better than it was.
By the way, it could be possible that over-hyping
attitude wasn’t new for them, having probably done it before with the twin-engined FW-187, its performances and even its
supposed “air kills” (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Fw_187).
FW-187 was likely a good plane on which in my opinion,
alike on He-100, too many people have daydreams and “what if”. And we have to
remember that whereas prototypes performances were very good, it probably
would haven’t been so much superior to competitors if tested fully armed (and
better if with a modified cockpit for the poor rear gunner!) and not relieved from
the guns load (just as the story of the disastrous Ta-154 remarks).
Sad to say, there is at least a sensational and
documented case of cheating by a member of Tank’s designer group, although
unrelated to WWII plane development: Ronald Richter, a braggart “scientist” who
fooled the Argentinian president Peron about nuclear fusion (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Richter
, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huemul_Project
, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ronald-richter-myth-centres-excellence-victor-deutsch/
).
Richter, who joined Tank’s team in Argentina just after the war, was
recommended to Perón by Kurt Tank himself.
I’m not sure if this could be a more general clue
about Tank’s habits …
I don’t know if this is true
“Eric Brown stated the D-9 was the best. He met Tank
after war, & according to him Tank agreed that the Dora was best & he
should have concentrated on improving it instead of making 152.” (http://www.ww2f.com/weapons-wwii/12510-flying-152-a.html#post151810
)
but I wouldn’t be surprised if it were.
So, maybe in the end even Tank dropped the myth.
What surprises me is that the myth goes on!
I think that is largely due to myth spreading during
all these years (both by German and not-German sources), coupled by a good
amount of ignorance by many.
Look at low-medium level performances and you'll find that FW190D, especially
the late FW190D-11 and 13, were fantastic machines even when compared to Ta152H
(which, after all, was designed as high-alt interceptor!).
And when I look at the poor kill/loss ratio of a plane flown by so many aces, I
always wonder how it's possible that someone still depict it as "the
best WWII piston fighter"!
It’s fully understandable that during the dying but
still ferocious Hitler’s Reich, both Tank and pilots like Aufhammer
needed some propagandistic reasons to defend themselves.
Just to make clear these are not airy-fairy
hypothesis: in 1944 Kurt Tank had to defend himself by the absurd charge of
sabotage (related to several “unexplained” Ta-154 crashes), before a tribunal
chaired by Goering!
In light of that, is much easier to understand so much
hype and barely credible stories …
If it was precautionary propaganda what they were
looking for, during those terrible months in 1945, they succeeded in producing
it.
Now, more than sixty years after and with no SS
around, it’s time to stop propaganda.
It has to be frankly said that, uninformed enthusiasts
apart, there is also a quite clear
business revolving around Ta152 (books, models, etc.), which seems to
me being by far one of the most lively in those markets, that greatly benefits
from that overhype and likely contributes to sustain it.
About this plane there are even funny “legends” (?) such as the flight of a red-orange Ta152, as
reported by Aufhammer and Cescotti.
They said that on March 22, 1945, such an oddly painted Ta152 was flown by Aufhammer from Stendal to Rechlin (a 100 km distance, it should need about a 30
minutes flight), to allow him to attend a meeting with Focke-Wulf
engineers.
Cescotti escorted him riding a FW190 D-9.
It is said that the purpose of this bright Orange-Red color
was to prevent trigger-happy German flak gunners from shooting down this
unusual Luftwaffe fighter.
This story raised very different reactions, from the enthusiasts very happy to
have another “Ta152 tale” (and a bright and merry Ta152 to talk about), to the very
skeptical, if not outraged, dismissing that account
as unlikely if not ridiculous.
One critic wrote: “In my opinion the Ta
152 painted allover in orange on the Eagle cals decal sheet ECD 48134 is very doubtful to say the least.In March of 1945 the Luftwaffe didn't have enough
colour to paint many of its planes and this aircraft was repainted for a 25
minutes flight from Stendal to Rechlin
to avoid being shot down by German Flak and was repainted in its original
camouflage after it returned?
It is more likely that such a colourful aircraft would have been shot down by
the allied who by that time had air superiority over Germany.That's
more Harakiri than an attempt to survive an already
lost war.”
Another one said “It still seems a
ridiculous way of protecting a Ta 152 on a 25 minute flight”.
I agree.
If they really did that, it was quite ridiculous and of very dubious
advantage. But it could be true and a could be a further sign that Aufhammer wasn’t a “brave heart”, just like I already
suspected …
However, the book-writer Jerry Crandall made Aufhammer and Cescotti sign a
“certificate of authenticity” about that event (which he describes as a “45
minutes flight”).
So, it could be true or it could be that the “historical Ta152 group” is used
to … joke about that plane! 
In any case, even this limited and controversial
account immediately made grow some more business, from book chapters to plastic
models!
But this business
aspect of “Ta152 tales” is unrelated
to the issues here discussed, it’s a different matter …
… MAYBE! 
In the end, I have to say that the myth of Ta152 being
“simply the best” has gone so far that is not easy to stop it … but not too
difficult, indeed!
I hope that this analysis helps in debunking that
persistent myth and, more important, to
encourage in preventing further myth spreading in the future, whatever
plane it regards and from whichever side it could come.
CloCloZ
ChangeLog:
July 31st , 2010: some
considerations added about the first dubious victory claimed by Josef Keil and the substantial failure of Ta152 as a
high-altitude bomber interceptor.
September 12th , 2011: more
details added about Sheddan’s kill, strongly
reinforcing the probability it was fully unrelated with the Ludwigslust
battle here examined;
a
section has been added about objections and criticisms to my reconstruction.
January 12th , 2018: a
critical examination has been added about the quite unlikely “Skupina hypothesis” (which states that Shaw really shot
down a FW190 flown by Kurt Georg Skupina, in a
different area than usually believed);
several
pictures has been added to improve page layout and to facilitate text
comprehension (such as showing how much similar-looking are FW190 D-9 and
Ta152-H when saw from the side);
a
part about the Ta152-related business have been added;
some
of the obsolete web links have been updated (other remains, unfortunately);
some
considerations has been added in the part dealing with Allied pilots’ reports
consistency and reliability;
some
minor “cosmetic” changes has been done.